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I want to pay tribute to those who have wrestled with the divine decrees to
election and to reprobation, attempting to see justice in them. My remarks are
not to denigrate these attempts. I am pleading, rather, for a rethinking of the is-
sues in an expanded worldview. I will argue here for what I call a cosmic con-
troversy biblical worldview. This worldview will bring us to these issues in a
fresh way that penetrates beyond the Calvinist-Arminian debate. These cosmic
dimensions will take us beyond the classic teaching of predestination to a new
understanding.
Concerning protological questions, Randall G. Basinger notes, ÒThese is-
sues presuppose some of the most thorny and divisive metaphysical issuesÓ and
Òthe age-old faith/reason debate is never far below the surface.Ó1
It is essential that a theology based on Scripture be internally consistent, and not
appeal to some inscrutable hidden mystery in GodÕs eternal decrees that repro-
bates multitudes while at the same time speaking of God as love. Nor should a
system true to the balance of Scripture be interested in focusing on the sovereign
will of God to the exclusion of His other attributes as loving, merciful, good,
and just. Nor should it accept the claim that the cause of human destiny in the
eternal decrees is unfathomable because GodÕs ways are beyond human com-
prehension. For it is God who invites humans to Òcome now let us reason to-
getherÓ (Isa 1:18).
Evil and the Cosmic Controversy
Human protology begins with creation (Gen 1-2), when God created Adam
and Eve in His image (Gen 1:26-27). In what way were they in His image?
GodÕs image is seen in their freedom to choose, in their dominion to rule, and in
their relationship. They could choose whether to obey or ignore GodÕs warning
                                                           
1Randall G. Basinger, ÒExhaustive Divine Sovereignty: A Practical Critique,Ó in Clark H. Pin-
nock, ed, The Grace of God and the Will of Man, 192.
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about the forbidden tree (Gen 2:16-17). They were given dominion to rule over
things in this world as God rules over the universe (Gen 1:26). In the relation-
ship of two individuals who loved each other, they mirrored the relationship of
love within the Trinity. Evidently, Satan and the angels who followed him in his
rebellion in heaven prior to human creation had misused their freedom to
chooseÑas humans would do
EveÕs temptation was only a real temptation if she was free to choose. Two
opposing claims met head on in her temptation. The crafty serpent (this is Satan;
see Ezek 28:14-17; Rev 12:9; 20:2) said, ÒDid God really say, ÔYou must not eat
from any tree in the garden?Õ The woman said to the serpent, ÔWe may eat fruit
from the trees in the garden, but God did say, ÒYou must not eat fruit from the
tree that is in the middle of the garden, and you must not touch it, or you will
die.ÓÕ ÔYou will not surely die,Õ the serpent said to the woman. ÔFor God knows
that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God,
knowing good and evil.ÕÓ (Gen 3:1-5). The serpent questioned GodÕs word. He
was saying, ÒGod cannot be trusted. He is keeping something back from you
which you could have if you eat. His forbidding is not in your best interests,
Eve. Therefore God is unjust. Reject His claim and eat the fruitÑyou can be-
come like God.Ó A heady idea, indeed!
Think of it. Eve was confronted by two opposing claims. Only one could be
true. Her preincarnate Creator Christ (John 1:1-3; Col 1:16-17; Heb 1:1-2) had
given her life, her husband, the world to have dominion over, and a beautiful
garden. The crafty serpent had given her nothing except a claim contrary to
ChristÕs claim, with his own ÒwisdomÓ as supporting evidence. Why would she
believe the one who had given her nothing and turn from the One who had given
her everything? Scripture says, ÒWhen the woman saw that the fruit of the tree
was good for food and pleasing to the eye, and also desirable for gaining wis-
dom, she took some and ate itÓ (Gen 3:6). She saw the forbidden food would
give wisdom. How? Logic suggests that the crafty serpent ate the fruit and
claimed the eating of it had given himÑa serpentÑthe ability to talk human
language (ÒwisdomÓ). The apparent truth of this is what she saw. One can hear
him say, ÒEve, if I a snake can speak your human language after eating the fruit,
think what you a human can becomeÑlike God. Look, IÕm not dead, am I?Ó
What could have kept Eve true? Believing GodÕs warning was from Some-
one who wished her nothing but good. Her choice was not predestined, but her
own, even though illogical. God would not predestine such a choice against His
warning. God would not predestine a decision to question His truthfulness and
justiceÑin essence to act upon a belief that God is a liar. ThatÕs the enemyÕs
offensive in the cosmic controversy. Any idea which calls into question GodÕs
justiceÑeven though it is a theological idea hallowed by centuries of
thoughtÑshould be evaluated in the light of SatanÕs charge against God (which
is what we will attempt in this article).
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Was this the same approach Satan used in heaven when he launched the
cosmic controversy? God says of Him, ÒYou said in your heart, ÔI will ascend to
heaven; I will raise my throne above the stars of God; I will sit enthroned on the
mount of assembly, on the utmost heights of the sacred mountain. I will ascend
above the tops of the clouds; I will make myself like the Most HighÕÓ (Isa
14:13-14). In Eden Satan said, Òyou will be like God.Ó In heaven he wanted the
same experience. He thought he could become God, sit on GodÕs throne, in spite
of the fact that it was Christ who had created him (John 1:3) and given him eve-
rything, given him freedom of choice and a position as a guardian cherub at the
throne (Ezek 28:14-15). In Eden the serpent was instilling in Eve a doubt and
desire similar to the doubt and desire he nourished within himself in heaven. The
fact that He wanted to become as God and suggested Eve could do the same
indicates his belief that God was holding this possibility back from him, and to
that extent was unjust. This is why questions about the justice of God are a part
of the cosmic controversy and should be the larger biblical worldview within
which questions of protology and eschatology must be evaluated.
The very fact of evil in GodÕs good universe suggests that beings created by
God are in rebellion against Him. This is a cosmic controversy. The justice of
God has been called in question by Satan, by his followers, and by every human
being, both those in rebellion against God and those who, like Job, are reckoned
ÒblamelessÓ because they have submitted to GodÕs call. One cannot speak of
GodÕs sovereign will decreeing who will be saved and who lost and hope to
convince those investigating GodÕs justice. The opposite is true. Any decree that
is arbitrary would be the greatest evidence that He is not just. It is not good
enough for scholars to say God is just to send to hell people He has never chosen
and never helpedÑbecause He is God. This merely assumes what needs to be
revealed. And it fails to be convincing, anyway. What picture of God does this
give unbelievers? Or believers? Would you want to spend eternity with this kind
of God? How do we know He will not do the same again to the saved some day?
The issue before the universe is to decide, based on evidence, whether or
not God is just and Satan wrong to accuse Him of injustice, then acknowledge
Him as such. The universe must decide whether God is to be trusted, and so
obeyed as One who always knows best. Questions of protology and eschatol-
ogyÑof GodÕs relationship to His created beings, of human freedom and des-
tinyÑare crucial information for making this decision. It should be remembered
that all created beings, both the saved and the lost, must be convinced to bow
their knees (Isa 45:23; Rom 14:11; Phil 21:10-11; Rev 5:13; 15:3; 19:1-6). So
the stakes are high. It is not enough to have only the saved agree that God has
judged righteously. They would find it easy to say He is just. The reprobate must
also acquiesce. What evidence will convince them? It will have to be evidence
beyond doubt. This is why it is essential that the cosmic issue be kept center
stage in questions of protology and eschatology, for it is in this issue that they
both meet. We need a protology informed by eschatologyÑthe divine decrees
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must be seen in the light of the Final Judgment. For it is at the Final Judgment
that all created beings will acknowledge the justice of their fate.
This is why we title the chapter, Òthe impact of eschatology on protology.Ó
Much of the chapter will present thinkers who have called in question protologi-
cal questions. Of those cited, only John Wesley questions protology in the light
of the Final Judgment and thereby breaks through to new ground to examine
protology in the light of that eschatological event. What remains to be done is to
go further and examine all that is involved in the Final Judgment in the light of
the issue in the cosmic controversy which will be resolved in that Judgment.
If a system is wrong in its protology it will be wrong in its eschatology. So
it is necessary to carefully examine the protological issues to establish the bibli-
cal view. Calvinism and Arminianism have fought over these issues for centu-
ries with little progress. It is time to transcend the debate and look at it from the
vantage point of the cosmic controversy over the justice of God, particularly at
Calvary, where the two sides met in the decisive battle of the war. As we will
see later, the way humans respond to that decisive battle will have everything to
do with their final destiny and will be the deciding factor in the Final Judgment.
Now we will turn to a Jesuit priest, three Protestant theologians, and a
leading contemporary philosopher to study correctives to protological thinking.
Then we will come to the book of Romans that launched the Reformation, the
mission of Christ that inspired it, and the Final Judgment to see their contribu-
tion to looking at protology in a broader context.
Correctives to Protology
Protology that confines future events, including eschatology, to divine de-
terminism, where foreknowledge is based upon eternal sovereign decrees, has
dominated much of Christian thought since Augustine. ÒIn the Middle Ages
Anselm, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas followed the Augustinian view to
a certain extent.Ó And later, ÒIn pre-Reformation times Wycliffe and Huss set
forth strict predestinarian views.Ó2 We have seen how much Luther and Calvin
contributed to this debate. It Òbecame the official teaching of the Church of
England as summarized in the Thirty-nine Articles.Ó Even some Catholics pro-
moted predestination, such as some Dominican theologians and the Jansenists.3
CalvinÕs view of predestination dominated the thinking of post-Reformation
theology. ÒThe Puritans of England and those who early settled in America, as
well as the Covenanters in Scotland and the Huguenots in France, were thor-
ough-going Calvinists.Ó4
                                                           
2Loraine Boettner, ÒPredestination,Ó BakerÕs Dictionary of Theology, Everett H. Harrison, ed.
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1988),  415.
3W. R. Godfrey, ÒPredestination,Ó New Dictionary of Theology, Sinclair B. Ferguson, ed.
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1988),  529.
4Loraine Boettner, BakerÕs Dictionary of Theology, 416.
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The formal corrective to these views on protology was made by Jacobus
Arminius (1560-1609), and is called Arminianism. It has had wide influence.
We will note its advances over the Augustinian-Lutheran-Calvinistic predesti-
nation, but comment on some of its excesses. On balance it supports human
freedom and the ability of the human will, which is necessary in the context of a
cosmic controversy, where humans need to be free to decide on the justice of
God. Although the portrayal of God is much better in Arminianism than in the
other tradition, it fails to be a full corrective.
In presenting these correctives to protology, I have chosen to present each
thinker very much as one would present witnesses in a trial. I will allow them to
speak for themselves, then comment on any relevance to the issue of GodÕs ma-
ligned justice when appropriate. As such, one runs the risk of some repetition. I
am aware of this, but want each witness to take the stand and give his evidence.
It will be seen that the combined witnesses present a powerful case for correct-
ing the problems of protology.
Before looking at the theology of Arminius and Arminianism, we first note
a Jesuit reaction to the Protestant views on Predestination.
1. Luis Molina, (1535-1600)
Luis Molina was a Spanish Jesuit who made his major theological contribu-
tion after the Protestant Reformation was well underway (1517 onwards) and
after the Council of Trent (1545-1563). As Alfredo J. Freddoso points out,
Molina was a central thinker in one of the most tumultuous doctrinal disputes in
Catholic  intellectual history.5 His Concordia,  published in 1588,  showed the
compatibility of free choice with gifts of grace, divine foreknowledge, provi-
dence, predestination and reprobation.6 Here the newly formed Jesuits (1540)
had a major work that challenged the established orders, particularly the Do-
minicans, who were loyal to the theology of Thomas Aquinas.
(a) Causal Determinism Called in Question
Aquinas, along with Aristotelian scholastics, focused on the eternity of God
that makes all dimensions of time present to Him, just as His omnipresence
makes all space present to Him. ÒMedieval philosophers often explicate this
temporal omnipresence by analogy with GodÕs spatial omnipresence.Ó7  Hence
the future is known to God simply because it is already present to Him. While
                                                           
5Molina and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) were Jesuits who supported human freedom, and
opposed Mercederian Francisco Zumel (1540-1607) and the Dominican Domingo Banez (1528-
1604) who supported the divine prerogative. Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of
the Concordia), trans. and Introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso (London, UK: Cornell Univ. Press),
1988, vii. Afterwards listed as Concordia.
6The full tile was Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia,
Praedestinatione et Reprobatione Concordia.
7Concordia, Introduction, 31.
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accepting the omnitemporality of God, Molina denies that future things exist in
eternity before they exist in time. MolinaÕs major difference with Thomas Aqui-
nas8 and Domingo Banez is his claim that GodÕs foreknowledge Òis prevoli-
tional rather than the result of GodÕs free act of will.Ó9
Molina opposed causal determinism.10 This is crucial, because the perennial
question before philosophers and theologians has been which comes first, GodÕs
foreknowledge of events so they are known, or GodÕs willing of those events so
they are known? Molina maintained that if God predetermined PeterÕs sin, for
example (rather than permitting it), then He is to that extent responsible for it.11
Molina opposed the idea that humans are mere puppets in GodÕs hands.12
 (b) Concomitant Theory Called in Question
Besides those who have placed divine will before divine foreknowledge, or
divine foreknowledge before divine will, there are those who see them as si-
multaneous from eternity. This is called the Concomitant theory, which Norman
Geisler espouses today. Geisler says ÒWhatever he forechooses cannot be based
on what he foreknows. Nor can what he foreknows be based upon what he fore-
chose. Both must be simultaneous and coordinate acts of God. Thus God know-
ingly determined and determinately knew from all eternity everything that
would come to pass, including all free acts.Ó13 Molina opposed this Concomitant
theory.
Concomitant theorists do injustice to prophecy. For example, Jesus told
Peter that he would deny Him three times (Luke 22:34). Yet they teach that Pe-
terÕs sin was not a part of the divine plan until Peter actually denied Him. Then
ChristÕs prophecy is also not a part of the divine plan argues Molina. This calls
in question that prophecy.
(c) Importance of Human Will
Aquinas and the Reformers emphasized that God wills future events, so
they are known. But this places future events as contingent upon GodÕs will in-
stead of upon creaturely will. Yet, creaturely will must have a part to play, or it
is not truly free, and hence the resolution of the cosmic controversy over the
justice of God is not served. For if humans are not free in their actions, their
actions are predetermined, and to that extent God would be responsible for the
sin-problem in the universe, and hence His justice could not be demonstrated to
                                                           
8Aquinas believed that the future is present to God before its cause in time, an idea opposed by
Molina. As a place is not present to God before it exists, so, said Molina, time is not present to God





13David & Randall Basinger, Predestination and Free Will: Four Views if Divine Sovereignty
and Human Freedom (DownerÕs Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1986), 71.
JOURNAL OF THE ADVENTIST THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY
60
those in rebellion who claim He is unjust. Hence the cosmic controversy issue
would remain insoluble.
The Reformers taught that sin brought total depravity which removed the
possibility of human free will. Molina presented a doctrine of omniscience
called scientia media, or middle knowledge. ÒBy means of this doctrine, he pro-
posed to avoid the Protestant error of denying genuine human freedom, yet
without thereby sacrificing the sovereignty of God. It is a sad note of history that
in MolinaÕs perception, the main point of the Protestant Reformation was that
man lacks true freedom in virtue of GodÕs knowledge and sovereignty.Ó14 We
will look at this middle knowledge later.
The Council of Trent taught that the process of justification by faith in-
volves ÒGodÕs unmerited, prevenient grace, which stirs and solicits the will of
man, but which may be either accepted or resisted by human will.Ó Molina ac-
cepted this and Òopposed himself to what he perceived to be the central teaching
of the Reformation: the denial of human freedom.Ó Molina, like the Council of
Trent, looked at soteriology as a joint work between God and man,15 and to that
extent missed the fact that the gospel is a free gift to be elected (chosen) or re-
jected, and only in the matter of response elicits human free will. There is no co-
operative human works to accomplish salvation, but there is a necessary free
choice if the gift is to be received.
TrentÕs and MolinaÕs view of human free will was an opposite extreme to
Protestant denial of human free will in the election/reprobation process. Both
overlooked the function of human free will as a necessary response (and only
that) to the gift of salvation, in either acceptance or rejection. Neither the Pro-
testant nor Catholic views resolved the tension between divine sovereignty and
human freedom, and yet that resolution is fundamental to a proper understanding
of salvation and to the resolution of the issue in the cosmic controversy.
According to the Reformers, because of GodÕs foreknowledge (Luther) and
providence (Calvin), everything that happens in human history does so neces-
sarily. Even though they speak of freedom of choice, the will cannot choose
other than it does. This posed serious problems to Molina, for how, on those
terms, could humans be free moral agents, and who would be responsible for
evil? How could prescience, providence, and predestination be seen as compati-
ble? He believed scientia media (middle knowledge) was the solution.16
(d) Middle Knowledge
There are three moments in the knowledge of God. They are not temporally
arranged, as if in a sequential order, but are logically arranged so that one aspect
is prior to others, while simultaneous. They are: (1) Natural knowledge (2) Free
                                                           
14William L. Craig, in Clark H. Pinnock ed., The Grace of God and the Will of Man (Minnea-
polis, MN: Bethany, 1989),  141.
15William L. Craig, in The Grace of God and the Will of Man, Ibid.
16William L. Craig in The Grace of God and the Will of Man, 144.
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knowledge, and (3) Middle knowledge, the latter coming between the first two.
Natural knowledge does not depend upon GodÕs will, but upon His nature as
God. He knows all possibilities. He knows all the possible persons He could
create. Free knowledge is GodÕs knowledge of the actual world He created, and
foreknowledge of everything to take place in it.
Natural knowledge is before any determination of GodÕs will, and free
knowledge is after the decision of GodÕs will to create the world. GodÕs knowl-
edge does not cause anything. Between natural and free knowledge comes mid-
dle knowledge. Middle knowledge comes before any determination of the divine
will. It not only knows what a person could do but what the person will do if
placed under certain circumstances. Though knowing this, it does not cause or
control the personÕs willing and doing. As William L. Craig puts it, ÒMiddle
knowledge, like natural knowledge, thus is logically prior to the decision of the
divine will to create a world.Ó17 Or as Jerry L. Walls expressed it, ÒThis means
that God has no control over what he knows through middle knowledge. He is
passive rather than active with respect to this kind of knowledge. What God
knows depends on what choices free persons would make of their own ac-
cord.Ó18
Middle knowledge means that God does not arbitrarily will, and thus violate
human free will. It does not mean that predestination is the basis of foreknowl-
edge. It simply means God knows how persons will exercise their free will
without causing it to happen. Hence eternal destiny is not dependent upon God,
but is up to the free will choice of humans. They can freely accept or reject sal-
vation. How paradoxical that Molina, and the Jesuits who promoted this view,
should grasp the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom in a
way that escaped the Augustinian-Lutheran-Calvinistic predestination tradition.
Their doctrine of divine predestination/providence was true to the gospel, as
opposed to the ReformersÕ position, even though their soteriology was not true
to the gospel (salvation by works).
It took the thinking of these Jesuits to break through to a proper balance
between divine and human willing, a balance vital to appreciating the justice of
God, at issue in the cosmic controversy before the universe. It was important
that the Reformers break through to a new understanding of justification by
faith, but if they could have grasped the middle knowledge of God in predesti-
nation/providence, they would have taken the freedom of the gospel to new
heights and discovered the compatibility of divine will and human willing.
Commenting on MolinaÕs Middle Knowledge, Robert M. Adams said,
ÒMolina held that God, in His omniscience, knows with complete certainty what
every possible free creature would freely do in every situation in which that
                                                           
17This whole section is based upon William L. CraigÕs presentations in The Grace of God and
the Will of Man, 146-147, and The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and
Human Freedom, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1987), 127-152. The quote is on 130.
18Jerry L. Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation (MI: University of Notre Dame, 1992), 38.
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creature could possibly have occasion to act freely. The knowledge thus ascribed
to God was called Ômiddle knowledgeÕ (scientia media) by Molina, because it
was seen as falling between his knowledge of the merely possible and His
knowledge of the actual, and between His knowledge of the necessary truths and
His knowledge of truths that He causes to be true.Ó19
John Feinberg says, ÒMiddle knowledge is knowledge of counterfactuals;
that is, knowledge of what would have happened if something else had occurred.
Some claim God knows the future via middle knowledge. Consequently, we can
have indeterministic freedom since God does not know what will happen, and
God can be omniscient in the sense of knowing everything that could happen
and knowing what would happen if other things occurred.Ó20
The important contribution made by Molina was calling into question di-
vine determinism that robbed humans of free will. Protestant predestination was
called into question by contra-causal freedom. Whereas the Protestant Reform-
ers presented the freedom of the gospel against human works to earn it (Catholic
theology), the Catholic Molina grasped a deeper freedom of human willing that
the Reformers failed to comprehend, for they did not penetrate to the place of
human will in the freedom of the gospel. Saying salvation is unearned (versus
human works) is not the same as saying salvation is predetermined (apart from
human will). The deeper meaning of the freedom of the gospel includes the
freedom of human willing as necessary to human destiny.
If this were not so, if destiny is predetermined by divine decrees (salvation
and reprobation), then humans become mere puppets in the hands of God. This
means their choosing or rejecting God would not be taken seriously, and hence
the cosmic controversy would also be insignificant. For if creaturely rebellion is
not rebellion, but merely the outworking of a divine plan, then how could those
puppet-creatures question the justice of God or fight against Him in the cosmic
controversy? Furthermore, how could any decision be made by those who have
no freedom to decide? For even their decision would be predetermined. And if
the consideration of GodÕs justice is before each created being, how could any
response to the question have any value if such a response is predetermined by
the very God who is the object of the question? This would be tantamount to
God rigging His own case.
2. Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609)
Jacobus Arminius was a Dutch theologian, educated at Leiden, Basel, and
Geneva, and became a professor at Leiden in 1603. He studied under Theodore
                                                           
19James E. Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen, eds, Alvin Platinga (Boston, MA: D. Reidel,
1985), 230.
20John Feinberg in Predestination and Free Will, eds. David and Randall Basinger (Downers
Grover, IL: InterVarsity, 1986), 33. In this definition of middle knowledge GodÕs absolute fore-
knowledge of the future is called in question, and to that degree is somewhat analogous to Process
Theology, neither of which do justice to divine omniscience.
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Beza (1519-1605), CalvinÕs son-in-law and successor, at Geneva. Beza contin-
ued the theology of Calvin, and it was this theology, with its divine decrees
overriding human free will, that Arminius rejected. He Òviews Christian doctrine
much as the pre-Augustinian fathers did and as did the later John Wesley.Ó21
In The Works of Arminius, volume 2, we find important topics on predesti-
nation that discuss divine election and human free will. In volume 3 we find his
analysis of Romans 9, a chapter often misused by exponents of Calvinistic de-
terminism. In both he is opposed to GodÕs irresistible grace that overrides hu-
man free will.22 Divine election is not solely based upon the electing God but
upon human response. Throughout Arminius emphasizes that belief and unbelief
are what decide human destiny, rather than an arbitrary decree of God irrespec-
tive of human response.23
Whereas the Augustinian-Lutheran-Calvinistic predetermination looked to a
Deus Absconditus, or hidden God, as the source of the divine decrees, Arminius
looked to Christ as the ÒFoundation of this decree.Ó24 No longer was human
destiny decided in the secret recesses of eternity; it was now decided in human
response to Jesus Christ in human history. And this is the only way that the
cosmic controversy issue before the universe will be decidedÑcreaturely re-
sponse to Jesus Christ (as we will see later). For Arminius predestination Òis the
Decree of the good pleasure of God in Christ.Ó He quotes John 6:40, ÒThis is the
will of God, that every one who seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have
everlasting life.Ó25 This is a good biblical definition of the will of God. His will
is not some arbitrary decree made in eternity, but is linked to Christ and His
salvation work for all mankind.
The eternal dimension of this decree Arminius rightly finds in Ephesians
1:4, ÒHe hath chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world.Ó26 As to
reprobation, God Òresolved from all eternity to condemn to eternal death unbe-
lievers who, by their own fault and the just judgment of God, would not believe.
. . . Ó27 Arminius believed God knows the future because He knows how people
will freely choose. ÒFor a thing does not come to pass because it has been fore-
known or foretold; but it is foreknown and foretold because it is yet (futura) to
come to pass.Ó28
In Romans 9, like so many others, Arminius misses the missiological
meaning of Jacob and Esau. But he does distinguish between the children of the
flesh and the children of faith in Christ. To the degree that these two groups are
                                                           
21J. K. Grider, ÒArminianism,Ó Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 79.
22The Works of James Arminius, trans. James and William Nicholls (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker,
1996), vol. 2, 53; vol. 3, 516.
23The Work of James Arminius, vol. 2, 53, 226, 698; vol. 3, 494-495, 497.
24The Works of James Arminius, vol. 2, 227.
25The Works of James Arminius, vol.2, 226.
26The Works of James Arminius, vol. 2, 227.
27The Works of James Arminius, vol. 2, 228.
28The Works of James Arminius, vol. 2, 368.
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distinguished he continues his focus on election involving human acceptance or
non-acceptance of Christ. Election is not only GodÕs willing in eternity, but hu-
man willing in time.29
Arminius Òattacked the speculative supralapsarianism of Beza on the
grounds of its lack of Christocentricity.Ó Secret eternal decrees were considered
prior to the mission of Christ in CalvinÕs and BezaÕs theology. ÒFor Arminius,
election was subsequent to grace. God decrees to save all who repent, believe
and persevere. Election is conditional on manÕs response, dependent on GodÕs
foreknowledge of his faith and perseverance.Ó Whereas Calvin and Beza had
God knowing the future because He predetermined it, Arminius had God
knowing the future because of what humans would freely choose. Whereas Cal-
vin and Beza confined foreknowledge to secret decrees in eternity, Arminius
took history seriously. ÒArminius was saying that God does not choose anyone
but instead foresees that some will choose him.Ó30
The views of Arminius are presented in his commentary on Romans 9, Ex-
amination of PerkinsÕ Pamphlet, and his Declaration of Sentiments. His view is
called Òconditional predestination.Ó It was no longer arbitrary and rooted in a
decree of God. It made evident that creaturely beings are responsible for evil in
the universe and are responsible for their own destiny. His protology does not
swallow up human actions and responsibility. He rejected the idea that grace is
irresistible (Calvin), noting that believers can lose their salvation.
So in the theology of Arminius human free will is the determining factor for
human destiny, rather than GodÕs sovereign free will that does not take into con-
sideration the free will of humans. Room for free human willing in salvation and
reprobation makes possible human response to the justice of God in the cosmic
controversy.
Although Arminius was right to be more Christocentric (than predestinari-
ans) in his understanding of salvation/reprobation, so that Christ, rather than
secret decrees of God, stands behind human destiny, he did not go on to develop
a Christology that is true to Scripture. He was right that the mission of Christ
radically calls in question the secret decrees of God, but he failed to follow
through with the implications of this view. He ended up having a confined un-
derstanding of the atonement, just as Calvin had a confined understanding of the
cause of human destiny.
In his Christology he says, Òsince Christ was held to have suffered for eve-
ryone he could not have paid the penalty for their sins, since all are not saved.
His death simply permits the Father to forgive all who repent and believe. It
makes salvation possible but does not intrinsically atone for anyone in particu-
lar. In fact, the atoning death of Christ was not essential for salvation by virtue
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of GodÕs own nature as both loving and righteous but was rather the means God
chose to save us for prudential administrative reasons.Ó31
This was the view that Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) developed later (1617) in
his Governmental Theory of the Atonement. In this theory God is sovereign, so
that ÒGodÕs pardon of sinners is within his absolute unfettered discretion, the
death of Christ being accepted by him as ruler or governor, not as creditor or
offended party. As ruler GodÕs interest is in the good government of the world.
The death of Christ illustrates the punishment which sin may attract and there-
fore serves good government by acting as a deterrent.Ó32
It is a curious paradox that Arminius rejected GodÕ sovereign act (predesti-
nating ruler) because of ChristÕs mission for humanity, and yet ended up limit-
ing that mission because of GodÕs sovereign act (forgiving ruler). He rightly
rejected the eternal secret decrees of God as sovereign ruler because it did not
take seriously the mission of Christ, yet he accepted the forgiving of God as
sovereign ruler, even though it didnÕt take seriously the mission of Christ.
3. John Wesley, 1703-1791
In The Works of John Wesley, vol. 10, there are two important sections on
predestination. They constitute a powerful argument for free will, in opposition
to divine determinism. Whereas Arminius blazed the trail in breaking away from
the ReformerÕs focus on the divine decrees, John Wesley continued the battle,
adding new insights and explaining it with clarity not found in the writings of
Arminius. Wesley rejects Òabsolute predestinationÓ33 or Òunconditional elec-
tion,Ó34 because they allege that God elects and damns individuals without them
having any choice in the matter. It is GodÕs will that is absolute. Human willing
doesnÕt affect the outcome. There are no human conditions that affect human
destiny, so the decrees are unconditional. This absolute and unconditional elec-
tion is presented as an exercise of GodÕs sovereignty. Freedom of choice to be
among the saved or among the lost is disallowed, for the choice is not made at
the human level in history, but at the divine level in eternity.
For Wesley election is conditional. ÒHe that believeth shall be saved; he that
believeth not shall be damned.Ó35 Clearly, for Wesley, human destiny depends
upon human response to GodÕs desire to save all mankind. Wesley rejects the
decree to reprobation. He asks, ÒHow can you possibly reconcile reprobation
with those scriptures that declare the justice of God?Ó36 This is a crucial ques-
tion. It impacts on the issue in the cosmic controversy, although Wesley never
discusses it within that broader biblical worldview. The very fact of an uncondi-
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tional decree where large numbers of humans are thrown into hell without their
having any say in their destiny would make impossible any free acknowledge-
ment of the justice of God.
Wesley rejects the view that God is merciful to elect even the few. He says
such mercy is called in question by the fact that God isnÕt merciful to the major-
ity of mankind. Predestinarians claim that ÒGod might justly have passed by all
men.Ó Wesley replies, ÒAre you sure he might? Where is it written? I cannot
find it in the word of God. Therefore I reject it as a bold, precarious assertion,
utterly unsupported by Holy Scripture.Ó37 Wesley points out that one attribute of
God (justice) cannot be separated from His other attributes (e.g. love, mercy).
Would it be loving or merciful to pass by all mankind? He rejects the use of
divine sovereignty by itself. God is not just sovereign. He is a merciful, loving
sovereign. ÒFor the Scripture nowhere speaks of this single attribute, as separate
from the rest. Much less does it anywhere speak of the sovereignty of God as
singly disposing the eternal states of men. No, no; in this awful work, God pro-
ceeds according to the known rules of his justice and mercy; but never assigns
his sovereignty as the cause why any man is punished with everlasting destruc-
tion.Ó38
The decree of reprobation, as taught by the Reformers, was God bypassing
the mass of mankind just because He did not choose to elect them. They receive
no help to live, and even if it were possible that they desired to live a better life,
they could not change their destiny. That was unalterably fixed in eternity. They
were born to eternal damnation, and can never choose otherwise. This is said in
defense of divine sovereignty. In reply, Wesley says, ÒThe sovereignty of God is
then never to be brought to supersede justice. And this is the present objection
against unconditional reprobation; (the plain consequence of unconditional elec-
tion;) it flatly contradicts, indeed utterly overthrows, the Scripture account of the
justice of God.Ó39
A major thesis of this chapter is the importance of thinking through issues
of protology in the light of eschatology. The fact of a Final Judgment is an im-
portant eschatological event in Scripture, the Creeds, and in theological systems.
The decree of reprobation has not been thought through in the light of this Final
Judgment in any systems known to this author, nor in any of the Creeds. Yet this
is precisely what must be done, and is what we will attempt later. But for now, it
is important to note that John Wesley makes an important contribution to this
question.
He asks, ÒHow shall God in justice judge the world, if there be any decree
of reprobation? On this supposition, what should those on the left hand be con-
demned for? For their having done evil? They could not help it. There never was
a time when they could have helped it. God, you say, Ôof old ordained them to
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this condemnation.Õ . . . .Shall he then condemn them for what they could not
help? Shall the Just, the Holy One of Israel, adjudge millions of men to ever-
lasting pain, because their blood moved in their veins? Nay, this they might have
helped, by putting an end to their own lives. But could  they even thus have es-
caped from sin? Not without that grace which you suppose God had absolutely
determined never to give them. And yet you suppose him to send them into eter-
nal fire, for not escaping from sin! That is, in plain terms, for not having that
grace which God had decreed they should never have! O strange justice! What a
picture do you draw of the Judge of all the earth!Ó40
Strange justice indeed! Think of how these reprobate will feel just before
being consigned to their punishment. Wesley imagines their conversation with
God. ÒRighteous art thou, O Lord; yet let us plead with thee. O why doest thou
condemn us for not doing good? Was it possible for us to do anything well? Did
we ever abuse the power of doing good? We never received it, and that thou
knowest. Wilt thou, the Holy One, the Just, condemn us for not doing what we
never had the power to do? Wilt thou condemn us for not casting down the stars
from heaven? For not holding the winds in our fist? Why, it was as possible for
us to do this, as to do any work acceptable in thy sight! O Lord, correct us, but
with judgment! And, before thou plungest us into everlasting fire, let us know
how it was ever possible for us to escape the damnation of hell.ÕÓ41
If God has elected the few to be saved and the rest to be damned, then the
judgment is already made. Why the need for the Final Judgment? Here an al-
leged protological judgment makes an eschatological judgment meaningless.
Wesley grasps this significance, and is one rare thinker who considers protology
in the light of eschatology. He says, ÒJustice can have no place in rewarding or
punishing mere machines, driven to and fro by an external force. So that your
supposition of GodÕs ordaining from eternity whatsoever should be done to the
end of the world; as well as that of GodÕs acting irresistibly in the elect, and Sa-
tanÕs acting irresistibly in the reprobates; utterly overthrows the Scripture doc-
trine of rewards and punishment, as well as of a judgment to come.Ó42
Wesley presses the point, giving Scriptures that demonstrate ÒGodÕs jus-
tice.Ó He has no pleasure in the death of the wicked (Ezek 18:23; 33:11). In fact
His love is for all mankind. (1) He died for all (2 Cor 5:14), (2) ÒHe is the pro-
pitiation for the sins of the whole worldÓ (1 John 2:2) and (3) ÒHe died for all,
that they should not live unto themselves, but unto Him which died for themÓ (2
Cor 5:15). He challenges anyone to find three Scripture passages that say the
opposite. He then notes that the  gospel commission is for all mankind, and asks,
Òhow could God or Christ be sincere in sending them with this commission, to
offer his grace to all men, if God has not provided such grace for all men. . . ?Ó43
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The justice of God is rightly important to Wesley. His justice involves
GodÕs love and mercy for all mankind, and the freedom of all mankind to either
accept or reject the eternal salvation that God has made possible through the life
and death of Christ. God has not arbitrarily pre-ordained through an absolute,
unconditional decrees the destiny of a few to salvation and the destiny of the
majority to damnation. In Christ He has made possible one destiny for all man-
kind. Whether that destiny is realized is up to human acceptance and belief.
By contrast, predestination gives humans no choice. Wesley returns to the
Final Judgment, and says, ÒJustice cannot punish a stone for falling to the
ground; nor, on your scheme, a man for falling into sin. For he can no more help
it than the stone, if he be, in your sense, fore-ordained to this condemnation.Ó
How can God condemn a person for not doing what he could never do? You
claim it is because of  Òthe sovereign will of God.Ó Then you have Òfound a new
God, or made one!Ó Wesley says, ÒThis is not the God of the Christians. Our
God is just in all his ways. . . . The glory of his justice is this, to Ôreward every
man according to his works.ÕÓ44
Predestination means destination decided before. It means, to predestinari-
ans, that those destinies are fixed, and cannot be altered. Hence the elect will be
saved, irrespective of what happens in human history, and the reprobate will be
lost irrespective of what happens in human history. But Wesley rightly points
out that God entered into covenant with Abraham and his descendants, and
Scripture clearly states the conditionality of this agreement (Exod Gen 36:2;
Exod 19:3; Lev 26:3). Furthermore, a believer can turn away and be lost (Ezek
18:24; Matt 5:13; 12:43-45; John 15:1; Acts 13:46; Rom 11:17; Gal 5:4; 1 Tim
1:18-19; 2 Pet 2:20; 3:17;  Heb  3:14; 6:4-6; Rev 3:11). The just live by faith,
not by election (Hab 2:4). Sanctification and holiness is essential for salvation.
Far from being irresistible, the Holy Spirit can be resisted by humans (Acts
7:51). Christ died for all mankind, but it is only those who believe who will be
saved. Conditions for salvation and for retribution deny the unconditional eter-
nal decrees.45
4. Karl Barth (1886-1968)
Karl Barth radically called in question the traditional doctrine of predesti-
nation, as we will see, but ends up with another kind of predestination that has
as many different problems as the one he called in question. There are two
stages to this process, first the work he did in his Romans commentary,
(1918/1921) and the next the work he did in his Church Dogmatics (1932-1970).
(1) Commentary on Romans
                                                           
44John Wesley, The Works of John Wesley, vol. 10, 234.
45John Wesley, The Works of John Wesley, vol. 10, 240-259.
GULLEY: THE IMPACT OF ESCHATOLOGY ON PROTOLOGY
69
Karl BarthÕs Commentary on Romans (Rmerbrief) was written against the
background of Schleiermachian existentialism, where the subject of theology
had become man (as seen in the Glaubenslehre), and one spoke about God by
speaking about man in a loud voice. This immanentism was challenged by Barth
with his call, ÒLet God be God.Ó
In his preface to the second edition, Barth gives credit to Plato, Kant and
Kierkegaard for their influence on his thinking.46 Each of these philosophers
posited a similar view of God. To Plato the gods were separated from mankind
by a chorizma, or unbridgeable gulf; for Kant we can never know God as He is
in Himself, and Kierkegaard said there is an infinite qualitative distinction be-
tween God and mankind. Each, in different ways, presented a distant god/God
who was opposite to the god of immanentism. This ÒWholly OtherÓ (Ganz An-
derer) God is the God of the early Barth, and continued to be right up to the
second attempt at writing his system, when the more existential Christian Dog-
matics vol 1 (1927) was replaced by the more objective Church Dogmatics vol 1
(1932).
In commenting on Romans 9, where God loves Jacob and hates Esau, Barth
speaks of the Òsecret of eternal, twofold predestinationÓ in a paradoxical way.
ÒNow, this secret concerns not this or that man, but all men. By it men are not
divided, but united. In its presence they all stand on one lineÑfor Jacob is al-
ways Esau also, and in the eternal ÔMomentÕ of revelation Esau is also Jacob.Ó47
The Church is both the observable Esau and the hidden Jacob, it is both rejected
and elected. ÒFor God is the God of Esau, BECAUSE He is the God of Jacob.Ó48
For Òwhilst He is, in every moment of time, the God of Esau, He is in eternity
the God of Jacob.Ó49
Here is an incipient universalismÑreprobate in time but elect in eternity.
Behind this paradoxical statement stands BarthÕs undeveloped Christology. ÒThe
process of revelation in Christ is decisive. In Time, we are vessels of wrath; in
Eternity, we are not merely something more, but something utterly different; we
areÑvessels of mercy.Ó50 ÒGod is unknown, apart from the knowledge which He
HimselfÑas the UnknownÑgives to us in Christ.Ó51
BarthÕs paradoxical language and philosophical insights clutter the devel-
oping Christology he is attempting to bring to protology. Unlike those before
Him, he is attempting in Romans to look at election/reprobation from a new per-
spective in Christ. This is a welcome breakthrough, but it is woefully inade-
quate, for his Christ remains in eternity, and at best stands only tangentially on
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the edge where time and eternity meet. There is no entrance of Christ into time,
to make revelation within human history. There is only the ever repeated en-
counters of revelation as divine eternity impacts human time. On these terms
Christ has not revealed the Father, and so He does not give historical evidence
about God to mankind. Such a revelation is necessary to understand what God is
like, whether He is just. BarthÕs incipient universalism is better than an arbitrary
predetermination to damnation, but his argument is less than convincing.
Later Barth criticized his Romans. It failed to do justice to the incarnation52
and to the love of God.53 He would have to wait until his Church Dogmatics to
take the incarnation seriously and think through the eternal decrees from within
the historical revelation of them in Jesus Christ. To this we now turn.
(2) Church Dogmatics
In his Church Dogmatics Barth rejected the secret decrees of the FatherÕs
election of a few, for the mission of universal salvation in which Òthe elect man
Jesus ChristÓ is the true object of the divine predestination.Ó54 Rather than have
the Father electing, it is now Christ who elects. But not only does He elect, He is
the elected man, where man means mankind (humanitas) and not just one indi-
vidual (homo). So the object of election is not some unknown, hidden secret in
the will of an unknown God, but is the election of Christ for the world. This is a
radical departure from the Augustinian-Lutheran-Calvinistic tradition. A more
ÒChristianÓ version of predestination is offered. Its universal breadth replaces
the choice of a few.
What does it mean that Jesus Christ is the electing God and the elected
man? The electing God is good news because it is true to Scripture. It over-
comes the dualism in the Godhead where the Father elects the few, and yet the
Son comes for the world. It removes the secrecy of the decrees with the revela-
tion of ChristÕs mission in history. No longer is the sovereign will of God the
manifestation of His glory and the revelation of His mercy and justice. Now the
will of God is revealed in the God-man. No longer is there an unknown God
who stands before and behind Christ, hidden in His secret, inscrutable willing.
For in Christ one has the exhaustive self-revelation of God, in which it is seen
that, ÒThe will of God is Jesus Christ.Ó55 ÒThe substitution of the election of
Jesus Christ for the decretum absolutum is, then, the decisive point in the
amendment of the doctrine of predestination.Ó56
The double decrees (election/reprobation) are no longer two separate desti-
nies. They are one in Christ. He is elected mankind and rejected God, for as the
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elected man He took the place of rejected mankind. Here all humans are objec-
tively elected to salvation in Christ, which is the root of BarthÕs tendency to uni-
versalism. Hence Òpredestination is the non-rejection of man.Ó57 This is an at-
tempt to look at predestination christologically. Judgment and mercy are given a
corporate function in the election of the Community. Barth says, ÒThis one
Community of God in its form as Israel has to serve the representation of the
divine judgment, in its form as the Church the representation of the divine
mercy.Ó58 Here Barth confuses the category of election with that of mission, and
makes the same mistake when commenting on Romans 9 when he calls Israel a
vessel of dishonor and the Church a vessel of honor.59
Concerning Judas, who betrayed Christ, Barth does not look at that as a per-
sonal act of rebellion, but Òas one element of the divine will and work.Ó He says,
ÒIn one sense Judas is the most important figure in the new Testament apart
from Jesus. . . . If we consider the indispensability of Judas from the point of the
view of the divine delivering-up of Jesus, we can almost understand for a mo-
ment what inspired the ancient sect which gave special veneration to this man.
In itself, it is no more foolish than the considerations which at a very different
point led to the veneration of Mary, the mother of Jesus. At any rate, we have to
say that the usual horror at this Ôarch-villainÕ (as Abraham a Sta. Clara puts it) is
quite unjustifiable in its over-simplification of JudasÕ actual function.Ó60 In other
words, Judas was used by God to hand Jesus over so that He could become the
Savior of all mankind, including Judas. He says, Òthe traitor Judas is the strange
instrument of the will of God.Ó61 So Barth can say that Òthe story of Judas is
extraordinary calm.Ó62 If that was true, why did Judas commit suicide? It seems
Barth is focusing more on the will of God that the will of Judas
Barth speaks of Òthe eschatological possibility,Ó of Òsalvation on the day of
the LordÓ for the rejected.63 In other words their rejection is only temporal, and
not eternal. He claims we need Òto accept the eschatological reality of the deliv-
ery of Jesus Christ in the place of sinners. And in view of the efficacy of this
event, we must not lose sight of the hope of the future deliverance of the rejected
at the very frontier of perdition.Ó64 Barth can say, Òthere is no good reason why
we should forbid ourselves, or be forbidden, openness to the possibility that in
the reality of God and man in Jesus Christ there is contained much more than we
might expect and therefore the supremely unexpected withdrawal of that final
                                                           
57Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2/2, 167.
58Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2/2, 195.
59Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2/2, 224.
60Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2/2, 502.
61Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 3/2, 214.
62Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2/2, 460.
63Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2/2, 486-487.
64Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2/2, 497.
JOURNAL OF THE ADVENTIST THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY
72
threat, i.e., that in the truth of this reality there might be contained the super-
abundant promise of the final deliverance of all men.Ó65
(3) Calvin and Barth Compared
The protology of Calvin and Barth are diametrically opposite. Whereas
CalvinÕs God is a hidden God, who made decrees in eternity that are secret, in-
scrutable, and past human comprehension, Barth rejected this view of predesti-
nation because it doesnÕt take the reality of Jesus Christ seriously. Barth presents
predestination of all mankind in Christ, the Electing God and the elected man.
The reality of rejection and election is found in the life and work of Christ, in
whom all humanity is found. So the election of everyone is wrapped up in the
election of the man Jesus. Even those rejected were elected in His death for
them. So much so that the eschatological possibility holds out the fact that all
may be saved, whereas for Calvin only the few elect will be saved.
Admittedly these two views are radically diverse. But they share common
ground in not allowing for the proper use of free human will in the process. Both
are built on a selective use of Scripture, and both end up doing a disservice to
the biblical revelation of human destiny. Because human will is not given its
proper place, the Òwhosoever believeth will be savedÓ emphasis in Scripture is
ignored. It is precisely this rejection of human free will which, if true, would be
sufficient to call in question GodÕs justice. How would it be just to damn those
who were not elected by CalvinÕs God, and how would it be just for all to be
saved according to the possibility of BarthÕs God?
In Scripture eschatological rewards are never forced upon all indiscrimi-
nately. Even final destiny takes into consideration human preparation (Matt
6:33; Heb 11:6; Rev 22:14-15). The God who asks humans to come and reason
(Isa 1:18) and allows them to reap what they sow (Gal 6:7 ), who made them in
His image (Gen 1:17-18) with the ability to think and to decide, respects their
freedom to choose sides in the cosmic controversy (Deut 30:19; Joshua 24:15)
on the basis of the evidence provided in His Word. One day, in the eschatologi-
cal judgment, all will have revealed to them the justice of God (Isa 45:23; Rom
14:10-11; Isa 45:23-24; Phil 2:10-11). It will be essential then that humans have
freedom to respond to that revelation, for God does not want to dictate the con-
clusion. There is no judicial universalism here, flowing from the fact that all are
predestined to say that God is just and the apostasy in unjust.
No! One day, in the final moments of eschatology, Òat the name of Jesus
every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth (in the entire
cosmos), and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God
the FatherÓ (Phil 2:10-1). All will see that God is just. This is not, as some have
argued, a second opportunity to turn to God and receive salvation. The wicked
will admit they have received the reward they have chosen for themselves, but
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they will not repent. The trust of the righteous in GodÕs justice will be shown to
be fully warranted. Before they have trusted, but now they see fully. Traditional
predestination cannot be lived, for Christians know they are using their wills
each day, willing to serve and share, and they know they choose Christ.
5. The Free Will Option
The greatest tragedy in the Augustinian-Lutheran-Calvinistic predestinarian
tradition is the rejection of free will, but it is cherished by the Òfree willÓ
churches. I do not speak of the use of free will for salvation in the Pelagian or
Catholic sense. No one can earn salvation. It is a free gift. But it is only a free
gift to ÒwhosoeverÓ will accept it (John 3:16-17). Human destiny is not inevita-
ble. It is not preordained, or forced upon humans against their will. Humans
must make a decision. Jesus said it right to Nicodemus, ÒYou must be born
againÓ (John 3:7). He did not say, ÒYou donÕt have to worry Nicodemus, you are
elected from eternity.Ó The fact that the new birth, Holy Spirit indwelling and
spiritual fruits, a changed life and fitness for heaven are pre- requisites for en-
trance must be taken seriously, for this is the biblical picture. God created hu-
mans with the ability to think, reason, and will because He did not want robots.
He wanted to dwell with humans, and will do so in the new earth (Rev 21:3).
Authentic relationship must be predicated upon a genuine interchange, even
though it is between created beings and their Creator.
The Confession of the Free Will Baptists, (1834, 1868) declares, ÒGod has
endowed man with power of free choice and governs him by moral laws and
motives; and this power of free choice is the exact measure of his responsibility.
All events are present with God from everlasting to everlasting; but his knowl-
edge of them does not in any sense cause them, nor does he decree all events
which he knows will occur.Ó66
6. Christological Focus in the Creeds
As we will see in this section, Karl Barth was not the first to consider elec-
tion in a Christological context. A number of creeds at least mention the con-
nection. All but two of the creeds we cite never allow the Òin ChristÓ view of
election to call in question the secret decrees from a hidden God beyond Christ.
They do not take seriously the fact that Christ came to save all mankind (John
3:16), and that human free will is involved in the Òwhosoever believeth in Him
shall not perish but have everlasting life.Ó (John 3:16). The Formula of Concord
(1576) says, ÒIn Christ, therefore, is the eternal election of God the Father to be
sought.Ó67 The Belgic Confession (1561) says that God, Òin his eternal and un-
                                                           
66Confession of the Free-Will Baptists, Chapter 3, #1,2; Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christen-
dom (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1996), vol. 3, 749-750.
67The Formula of Concord, Article XII. Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3, 169.
Even though the Formula says ÒChrist calls all sinners to himÓ (Art. VI), yet it denies human free-
will (Art. 11).
JOURNAL OF THE ADVENTIST THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY
74
changeable counsel, of mere goodness hath elected in Christ Jesus our Lord,
without any respect to their works:Ó68 The Scotch Confession of Faith (1560)
says, ÒFor that same eternal God and Father, who of mere grace elected us in
Christ Jesus his Sonne, befoir the foundation of the warld was laide. . . .Ó (Old
Scottish spelling).69   
The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England (1571) say, ÒPredestina-
tion to Life is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby (before the foundations
of the world were laid) he hath constantly decreed by his counsel secret to us, to
deliver from the curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out
of mankind, to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation. . . .Ó70 These creeds
do not think through the implication of the Òin ChristÓ focus. They merely quote
a biblical idea without allowing that idea to materially affect the way they look
at human destiny.
The next two creeds go further than the ones already cited and present the
real meaning of  Òin Christ,Ó and in doing so, show that the mission of Christ
was not a narrow election of the few, and that human free will is a necessary
human response that negates any divine predetermination. The creeds also show
the way that the debate could have gone if the Reformers had only allowed their
understanding of justification by faith in Christ to have informed their under-
standing of predestination by faith in Christ.
The Confession of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church (1829) incorpo-
rates some of the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647), but deletes the thorny
Calvinistic Chapters II-VIII, replacing them with an excellent, well-thought out,
Christ-centered interpretation of election. They suggest that Calvinists and
Arminians had gone beyond proper limits in probing predestination. They sug-
gest an Òintermediate plan.Ó This plan suggests that ÒGod is sovereign, having a
right to work when, where, how, and on whom he pleases.Ó ÒTherefore God, as
sovereign, may if he pleases, elect a nation, as the Jews, to preserve his worship
free from idolatry. . . . Christendom, in which to spread his gospel. . . . Cyrus
and others, to answer a particular purpose. . . . Luther and Calvin to promote the
Reformation. But as it respects the salvation of the soul, God as sovereign can
only elect or choose fallen man in Christ, who is the end of the law for right-
eousness to every one that believeth. But it appears to us incontestible, from
GodÕs Word, that God has reprobated none from eternity.Ó71
                                                           
68The Belgic Confession, Article XVI. Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3, 401.
Yet the Confession says there is no salvation outside the church (Art. XXVIII) and rejects human
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69The Scotch Confession of Faith, Article VIII. Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol.
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ÒReprobation is not what some have supposed it to be, viz., a sovereign de-
termination of God to create millions of rational beings, and for his own glory
damn them eternally in hell, without regard to moral rectitude or sin in the
creature. This would tarnish the divine glory, and render the greatest, best, and
most lovely of all beings most odious in view of all intelligence.Ó This is pre-
cisely the point. This would contribute to the doubt about His justice. This
would fuel the cosmic controversy. It would be damaging evidence that Satan
would gleefully disseminate.
The Confession continues, ÒWhen man sinned he was legally reprobated,
but not damned: God offered, and does offer, the law-condemned sinner mercy
in the gospel, he has from the foundation of the world so far chosen mankind in
Christ as to justify that saying in 1 Tim. Iv. 10, ÔWho is the Savior of all men,
especially of them that believe.Ó This is a gracious act of GodÕs sovereign
electing love, as extensive as the legal condemnation, or reprobation, in which
all mankind are by nature. But, in a particular and saving sense, none can be
properly called GodÕs elect till they be justified and united to Christ, the end of
the law for righteousness (none are justified from eternity. . . .Ó Furthermore if
anyone falls, Òhe was not bound by any revealed or secret decree of God to do
so: it is his own fault. For God declares in his Word that Christ died for the
whole world; that he offers pardon to all; that the Spirit operates on all; con-
firming by an oath that he has no pleasure in the death of sinners.Ó72
This is a true understanding of predestination Òin Christ.Ó Gone is an elec-
tion from a God behind Christ, hidden in the eternal recesses in secret and hid-
den decrees with their arbitrary election of some and damning of most. In its
place is a view of a loving Christ who comes to save all mankind, and therefore
reprobating none, so that all humanity have necessary free will to accept or re-
ject His saving mission for them. Jesus said, ÒAnyone who has seen me has seen
the Father (John 14:9). This is the revelation Christ made of His Father to intel-
ligent creatures that shows Him to be a God of great love and compassion for
everyone, and not merely for a select few. It is precisely such a manifestation
that is vital for the resolution of the cosmic controversy. For Christ came to
earth not merely to save mankind, but to manifest what God is like to the uni-
verse. We will take this up later when we look at the mission of Christ.
The Confession of the Evangelical Free Church of Geneva (1848) says, Òthe
true believer having been elected in Christ before the foundation of the world,
according to the foreknowledge of God, the Father, in the sanctification of the
Holy Ghost. . . . We believe that God, who so loved the world that he gave his
only Son, now order every man, in every place, to be converted; that every one
is responsible for his sins and his unbelief; that Jesus repels none who go to him;
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and that every sinner who sincerely appeals to him will be saved.Ó73  Here the
Òin ChristÓ election is seen in the light of John 3:16, where universal salvation is
based upon a human free will response to GodÕs gift. This is so much better than
The Confession of the Waldenses (1655) which says, ÒThat God so loved the
world, that is to say, those whom he has chosen out of the world, that he gave
his own Son to save us by his most perfect obedience (especially that obedience
which he manifested in suffering the cursed death of the cross), and also by his
victory over the devil, sin, and death.Ó74   
Here is one of the five traditional points of the Calvinistic view of salvation
(known under the mnemonic abbreviation TULIP): Total depravity, Uncondi-
tional predestination, Limited atonement, Irresistible grace, and Perseverance of
the saints. If humans are so depraved that they cannot choose Christ, and there-
fore election has nothing to do with their will, but solely with GodÕs will, so that
ChristÕs death was only for those whom God chose, and they alone can be saved
because grace is irresistible to them, causing them to persevereÑthen there is no
basis for intelligent beings to accept that God is just in the cosmic controversy
and bow their knees. How can God choose some and reject the rest without fac-
ing the charge of having favorites, being arbitrary and unjust?
The Òin ChristÓ focus recognizes the importance of human free will. The
Reformed Episcopal Articles of Religion (1875) say, ÒWhile the Scriptures dis-
tinctly set forth the election, predestination, and calling of the people of God
unto eternal life, as Christ saith; ÔAll that the Father giveth me shall come to
me;Õ they no less positively affirm manÕs free agency and responsibility, and
that salvation is freely offered to all through Christ.Ó75
The Creeds that really allowed the Òin ChristÓ focus of election to be true to
John 3:16 were true to human free will, and thus to a real choice for election or
rejection. They see humans as responsible for that choice, even as God is re-
sponsible for salvation. In this balance, no human destiny can be seen as unjust,
arbitrarily predetermined by a sovereign God whose mission is for His own
pleasure or glory. Such a view is totally foreign to the God who gave His Son to
save a world and invited all to accept salvation through belief in Christ. Only
such a God will be seen as just in the final Judgment, when every intelligent
being will have opportunity to respond to the revelation of God by acknowl-
edging His righteousness.
7. Alvin Platinga
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No contemporary philosopher has shed more light on the topic before us
than Alvin Platinga. He does so through two major contributions: examining the
problem of evil and presenting the Free Will Defense theory. We will take them
up in that order.
(a) The Problem of Evil
Gottfried W. Leibnitz (1646-1716) considered that this world is the best of
all possible worlds.76 He further suggested that an omnipotent God could have
created any possible world. Platinga calls this latter idea, ÒLeibnizÕs Lapse,Ó and
denied its validity.77 For God Òcould not have actualized a world containing
moral good but no moral evil.Ó78 For humans to be free God could not have cre-
ated a world in which all human actions result from external causation. There is
no compatibility between divine causation and human freedom. Thus, says
Platinga, ÒHe (God) cannot cause it to be the case that I freely refrain from an
action A; for if he does so, he causes it to be the case that I refrain from A, in
which case I do not do so freely.Ó79
Those believing in divine determinism, where everything created and their
actions are predetermined by God, where non-causation is absent, where deter-
minism and human freedom are considered compatible (compatibility theory)Ñ
must believe God ordained evil to exist, for nothing can exist (even evil) outside
of His divine pre-ordination and providence. Such a view presents God as
blameworthy for the existence of evil in His universe, and calls in question His
omnipotence, and more importantly for our study, it calls in question His justice.
For if God ordained the presence of evil, then to that extent at least, He is re-
sponsible for evil. If He is responsible for evil, then to that extent it is impossi-
ble to conclude that He is just in the eschatological Final Judgment.
Many philosophers claim Òthere is a contradiction involved in asserting, as
the theist does, that God is perfectly good, omnipotent (i.e., all powerful), and
omniscient (i.e., all-knowing) on the one hand, and, on the other, that there is
evil.Ó80 David Hume questioned,  ÒIs he willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he
both able and willing? Whence then is evil?Ó81 H. J. McCloskey says, ÒEvil is a
problem for the theist in that a contradiction is involved in the fact of evil, on the
one hand, and the belief in the omnipotence and perfection of God on the
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77See his extended discussion in The Nature of Necessity, 168-195.
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79Alvin Platinga, The Nature of Necessity, 171.
80Alvin Platinga, God, Freedom and Evil, 11.
81Alvin Platinga, God, Freedom and Evil, 10.
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other.Ó82 J. L. Mackie says, ÒI think, however, that a more telling criticism can
be made by way of the traditional problem of evil. Here it can be shown, not that
religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that
the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one
another.Ó83
Many philosophers, from Epicurus (342?-270 BC) to the present, Òbelieve
that the existence of evil constitutes a difficulty for the theist, and many believe
that the existence of evil (or at least the amount and kinds of evil we actually
find) makes belief in God unreasonable or rationally unacceptable.Ó84 In reply
Platinga gives a sustained logical, consistent, and careful analysis of these
claims and demonstrates that the existence of God in view of evil is reasonable
and rationally acceptable.
Platinga says that a theist may not be able to answer these questions, but
that inability should not be the final world. ÒThe fact that the theist doesnÕt
know why God permits evil is, perhaps, an interesting fact about the theist, but
by itself  it shows little or nothing relevant to the rationality of belief in God.Ó85
Having said that much, he then sets out to successfully answer these questions.
And his logic is a careful and consistent articulation of the Free Will Defense
theory.
(b) Free Will Defense
As Thomas P. Flint rightly points out, Òthe ethological argument from evil
can be successfully countered by a version of the Free Will Defense.Ó The Free
Will Defense believes that Òall evil might be the result of the free actions of
GodÕs creatures.Ó86 ÒIt is noteworthy,Ó says Jerry L. Walls, Òthat Molinism has
received renewed attention in contemporary philosophy, largely through Alvin
PlatingaÕs free will defense.Ó This includes PlatingaÕs acceptance of MolinaÕs
logic that God has Òmiddle knowledge.Ó87 Here God does not create evil, nor is
He therefore responsible for evil, but He did create beings with the ability to
choose good or evil, so that with the choosing came the responsibility for the
choice. Humans, like many angels before them, chose evil, and hence are re-
sponsible for the existence of evil within the otherwise good creation of God.
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85Ibid.
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Platinga defines his Free Will Defense.88 It is ÒA World containing crea-
tures who are significantly free (freely perform more good than evil actions) is
more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at
all. Now God can create free creatures, but He canÕt cause or determine them to
do only what is right. For if He does so, then they arenÕt significantly free after
all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral
good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He canÕt
give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent
them from doing do. As it turned out, sadly enough, some of the free creatures
God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is the source of
moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts
neither against GodÕs omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have
forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of
moral good.Ó89
Platinga rejects the idea that God could have created a world containing
moral good but no moral evil. He rejects the compatibility of divine determinism
and human freedom. His focus is therefore away from the divine determinism
found in much theology. For him, human freedom is a necessary component of
divine creation. One might add that humans are necessarily free because made in
the image of a free God (Gen 1:26-27). The very presence of evil in GodÕs per-
fect universe must come from the misuse of creaturely freedom, because the
only other cause for evil would be divine freedom, and God does not create evil.
The very fact of evil is a powerful evidence for the use of creaturely free will.
To suggest that God is somehow the cause of evil negates any chance of de-
fending His justice, for evil would be the prima facie case for His injustice.
Atheologians might say that Adam would not have sinned if God had
placed him on a different world from this one, and since God knew this, and did
not do it, then He is to be blamed for evil. PlatingaÕs answer to this is his con-
cept of Òtrans-world depravity.Ó Thomas P. Flint comments on PlatingaÕs view.
He says,  ÒIf Adam is truly free, it might be the case that, no matter what God
had done, Adam would (if created and left significantly free) have freely gone
wrong with respect to some action. If this is so, Adam suffers from trans-world
depravity, and God can create him and leave him significantly free only if he is
willing to let him do evil. Platinga argues that it is possible that all of us suffer
from trans-world depravity. If the atheologian then goes on to ask why God
didnÕt create other people, who didnÕt suffer from trans-world depravity, Plat-
inga can respond that God might not have had this option, for it is possible that
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every creaturely essence (i.e., every Ôpossible personÕ) suffers from trans-world
depravity.Ó90
ÒThe essential point of the Free Will Defense,Ó says Platinga,Ó is that the
creation of the world containing moral good is a co-operative venture; it requires
the uncoerced concurrence of significantly free creatures. . . . Of course it is up
to God whether to create free creatures at all; but if he aims to produce moral
good, then he must create significantly free creatures upon whose co-operation
he must depend. Thus is the power of an omnipotent God limited by the freedom
he confers upon his creatures.Ó91 This makes far more sense, to me, than the
eternal decrees that make all human action predetermined. The contribution that
Alvin Platinga has made to the Free Will Defense is crucial to the thesis of our
theological system.
For it is the Free Will Defense, Platinga argues so persuasively, that is the
only explanation for evil that fits in with the biblical world view of the cosmic
controversy as a rebellion of created beings against their Creator. For God could
not will or decree such rebellion and cause His created beings to be at war with
Him. He would be less than wise to do so. The very fact that the rebellion cost
Him everything, including the life and death of His Son, is ample evidence
against His causing the tragedy. Such a rebellion can only be the result of crea-
turely free will. Later, we will see that when this rebellion comes to a close in
the eschatological Final Judgment, then God will be seen as just by all those
who have exercised their free wills, whether saved or damned.
The possession of free will by humans is vital. Without such free will they
would be mere automatons or puppets. Such lack of freedom would keep them
from entering an intelligent relationship with their Creator, and thus they would
fail to realize the purpose of their creation, which is to have a meaningful fel-
lowship with God. This would not only affect human history on this planet now
(cf. Ezek 37:23, 26; Jer 7:23; 30:22; 31:1; 32:38; Matt 1:28-30, John 15:1-5),
but also affect human life in the eschatological new earth (Rev 21:3). Only as
humans are truly free can they really have a relationship with God in the present
and throughout eternity.
8. Four Views
Four views on divine sovereignty and human freedom are presented in a
1986 book titled Predestination and Free will.92 The four views are (1) God
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ordains all things (John S. Feinberg), (2) God knows all things (Norman Geis-
ler), (3) God limits His power (Bruce Reichenbach) and (4) God limits His
knowledge (Clark Pinnock). A careful reading through this volume gives im-
portant insights, some of which we will consider. The importance of this work is
the obvious difference that exists between the views, even though there are some
areas of concurrence. Does God cause human acts or not? Are humans robots or
not? Does God limit His power by making room for human freedom, or not?
Does God know all the future or not? These are the major views debated.
John Feinberg and Norman GeislerÕs view of God could be characterized as
a novelist who invents his/her characters and is in control of what they do in the
story. The characters are not free. They are at the mercy of their creator/novelist.
The picture of the Potter working over the clay in Romans 9:18-21 has been
used this way by exponents of divine causation. But Bruce Reichenbach and
Clark Pinnock do not subscribe to this model. To them humans have freedom to
make their own decisions and to chose their own destiny.
Bruce Reichenbach says, ÒWe must abandon the model which sees God as
the cosmic novelist. . . .Ó93 He calls for a distinction between God as sovereign
and God as novelist.94 The former is appropriate, the latter is not. He rightly
states that ÒGod cannot, without destroying our freedom, control us or compel us
to choose to act in ways that accord with his will or plan. If God has created us
free to choose to love and serve him, then God cannot cause us to do so. It is up
to us to accept or reject the grace offered us through the redemptive act of
Christ. We are not tools to be manipulated by God or other persons to achieve
their end. Rather, we are conscious beings who should be persuaded to freely
live according to GodÕs will and commands.Ó95
By contrast, Norman Geisler says, ÒI deny ReichenbachÕs view that God
does not have as much control over his free subjects as a novelist has over his
characters. From GodÕs eternal standpoint, history is just as determined as the
story in a novel. Yet the moral actions in history were all free.Ó96 Obviously they
cannot both be right. It is true that the plan of salvation was thought through
before the foundation of the world, has been carried out according to schedule,
and will accomplish its goal. Yet it is also true that each human will meet his/her
own destiny through free will/choice. God is the author of the plan of salvation,
but each person is free to relate to that plan as they choose, and so cannot relate
to it as a novel character relates to a novelist.
If God is a novelist and humans are but actors in His hands, to do as He
chooses, both now and in eternity, then there is no real human freedom, and so
there is no way humans can comprehend if God is just or not, much less admit
the fact in the Final Judgment. When we look at that Final Judgment, we will
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see that Scripture speaks of it as every knee bowing before God. They will do so
in utter freedom. With that in mind, it is worth pondering these words from
Reichenbach, Òthe sovereign cannot make the subjects freely acknowledge his
sovereignty. The sovereign can compel his subjects to bow in his presence, but
he cannot compel them to bow freely.Ó97
James I. Packer calls for evangelicals to accept both divine sovereignty and
human freedom, because the Bible teaches both.98 Problems arise when one is
stressed without giving proper place to the other. Much of theological thinking
has stressed the sovereignty of God and neglected the importance of the freedom
of humans. In defense of human freedom, Clark Pinnock observes that there are
two central biblical assertions about humans. Ò(1) they are historical agents who
can respond to God in love; and (2) they are sinners who have deliberately re-
jected GodÕs plan for them. Neither assertion would make sense unless we posit
the gift of freedom in the strong sense.Ó99
C. S. Lewis, in The Screwtape Letters, says, Òthe Irresistible and the Indis-
putable are the two weapons which the very nature of His scheme forbids Him
to use. Merely to override a human will . . . would be for Him useless. He cannot
ravish. He can only woo.Ó100  In The Great Divorce, C. S. Lewis says, ÒThere
are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, ÔThy will be
done,Õ and those to whom God says, in the end, ÔThy will be done.ÕÓ101 Fol-
lowing God or losing eternal life are both a result of human will. Destiny is pro-
vided by God but chosen by humans, so that in destiny is found the union of
divine sovereignty and human freedom. God invites all to eternal life, but will
force none. He longs for none to be lost, so he forbids none. Humans are free to
choose their destiny.
9. Book of Romans
Romans 9, with its alleged election of Jacob and reprobation of Esau; the
hardening of Pharaoh, and the potter making vessels to honor and dishonor,
seems to be the key passage for predestination promoted by the Augustinian-
Lutheran-Calvinist tradition. The word ÒelectionÓ means mission in this passage
(v. 12), and not decrees for election/reprobation. What we need to do now is to
see that an exegesis of these verses in Romans 9, apart from their context in the
Book of Romans, gives a distorted view of God. So in this section, we will go
chronologically through Romans and provide this larger context. It is within this
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larger context that the larger biblical world viewÑbeyond human salvation/loss
of salvationÑconcerning the cosmic controversy issue over GodÕs justice, can
be addressed.
Here is a list of the items in Romans that negate the confined elec-
tion/reprobation secret decrees:
(1) Rom 1:16. Salvation is through human belief, not through divine selec-
tion.
(2) Rom 1:16. Salvation is for Jews (Jacob) and Gentiles (e.g. Esau). This
negates the view that Romans 9:8-16 is election for Jacob and retribution for
Esau.
(3) Rom 2:10-11. Salvation for Jews and Gentiles, for God is no respecter
of persons. Choosing some to be saved and others to be lost is showing respect
of persons.
(4) Rom 3:6. God to judge the world. This future event would be unneces-
sary if He has already determined their destiny through His eternal choice.
(5) Rom 3:9, 22-24. Jews and Gentiles have all sinned. Salvation comes not
through some secret election, but through faith in Jesus Christ to all who be-
lieve. The difference between the elect and the reprobate is not some secret
choice of God but a known (belief) choice of humans.
(6) Rom 3:28-30. Jews (Jacob) and Gentiles (e.g. Esau) are justified by
faith, for God is the God of Jews and Gentiles.
(7) Rom 4:1-18. Abraham, grandfather of Jacob (Israel) and Esau was right-
eous  through faith, and not through divine decrees. He is the spiritual father of
all nationsÑof all who believe. This has to do with election to mission (not sal-
vation). Mission, like salvation, is dependent upon human faith (will), and not
upon divine decrees.
(8) Rom 5:9-10. Justification (salvation) comes through Jesus Christ, and
not through divine decrees.
(9) Rom 5:12-19. Sin came into the world through Adam and salvation
came into the world through Christ. Salvation is not through divine decrees, but
through Christ. So belief and faith are understood as belief and faith in Christ
and not in eternal decrees.
(10) Rom 8:32. Christ came for all mankind, and not just for an alleged
elect.
(11) Rom 9:24, 30-33. Even in Romans 9, where the alleged elec-
tion/reprobation ideas are found, Jews and Gentiles are both considered right-
eous by faith; and trust in Christ is the focus (v. 33). Clearly salvation is through
faith in Christ, a human response to the Savior, a human choice made in history
and not a divine choice made in eternity, a belief in a Savior revealed, and not a
predestination by God in secret decrees. So in the very chapter where predesti-
nation is allegedly found, there is ample proof that this is the wrong exegesis of
the texts.
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(12) Rom 10:9. ÒIf you confess with your mouth, ÔJesus is Lord,Õ and be-
lieve in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.Ó The
act of free will is necessary for salvation.
(13) Rom 10:12. ÒFor there is no difference between Jew and GentileÑthe
same Lord is Lord of all and richly blesses all who call on him. For, ÔEveryone
who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved.ÕÓ Here salvation is offered
universally to all on the same basis of calling on Him. Such an offer is not pos-
sible if God only elects a few, and damns the rest.
(14) Rom 11:20-23. One can lose oneÕs salvation and regain it, which is dif-
ferent from deterministic, irrevocable decrees.
(15) Rom 11:32-33. The unsearchable ways of God are mentioned in the
context of his mercy upon all. The hardening in Romans 9-10 should be under-
stood in the context of salvation for all if they choose to believe, and hence the
hardening is a result of not accepting that option. God allows them to go their
own way into hardening, and is credited for that which He permits.
(16) Rom 12:2. It is possible to Òtest and approve what GodÕs will isÑhis
good, pleasing and perfect will.Ó This is a long way from an inscrutable will,
hidden in eternal secret decrees, past human understanding.
(17) Rom 13:8-10. Keeping the law is all summed up in loving oneÕs neigh-
bor. If loving others is an evidence of salvation, then loving all mankind is an
evidence of the Savior, too.
(18) Rom 14:10-12. When everyone bows before God in the eschatological
judgment, each will give an account of himself/herself. There is no need to give
an account if the decision for salvation/damnation depends upon divine will and
not on human response. The fact of a judgment and the giving of rewards indi-
cates that destiny is decided in human history, and not in some prior eternity.
(19) Rom 15:7-18. The Gentiles (e.g. Esau) have hope in Christ.
(20) Rom 16:25-26. There is a hidden mystery, but it is not secret decrees
that remain inscrutable beyond human comprehension. Rather, Òthe mystery
hidden for long ages past, but now revealed and made knownÓ is that Òall na-
tions might believe and obey him,Ó which means all can be saved if they choose.
So throughout Romans salvation is based on faith, belief, choiceÑthe use
of human freedom to will, and not upon some divine will beyond human re-
sponse.
10. The Mission of Jesus Christ
The mission of Jesus is encapsulated best in the favorite text for all Chris-
tians, ÒGod so loved the world that He gave His SonÓ and Òwhosoever believeth
in Him, should not perish but have everlasting life.Ó Both parts are important (1)
universal love from God, and (2) human response to this love for salvation.
Those who confine the atonement to the elect do disservice to both parts of  this
text. For them it reads, ÒGod so loved the elect, so the elect will be saved.Ó LetÕs
consider the system of Lewis Sperry Chafer, theologian for Dispensationalists.
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On this point he says, ÒGodÕs attitude toward the entire human family is one of
infinite compassion and boundless sacrificial love. Though the two revealed
factsÑdivine election and the universality of divine loveÑcannot be reconciled
within the sphere of human understanding. . . .Ó102
No wonder he says Òdivine election presents difficulties which are insolv-
able by the finite mind,Ó103 speaks of the ÒcomplexityÓ of the doctrine, and says
problems involved in the doctrine are Òinsuperable.Ó104 No wonder Chafer says
the invitation ÒÔWhosoever will may comeÕ. . . concerns those only who are re-
generated and should never be presented to, or even discussed in the presence of
the unsaved.Ó105
There is a logical inconsistency, at this point, in ChaferÕs system. He as-
sumes that both universal love and particular election are revealed in Scripture,
but then says this is beyond human comprehension. But is this the only intelli-
gent option open to the biblical interpreter? How about taking John 3:16 at face
value, as a divinely revealed definition of GodÕs universal mission in Christ, that
He has given Christ for all mankind, but will not force His salvation on anyone,
for He respects human free will, and so those who accept His salvation, and be-
lieve in Him, will be saved. If only Chafer, and other predestinarians, could ac-
cept the biblical revelation on the importance of human choice, that human free
will is vital to the acceptance of divine salvation, then there would be no need to
claim the doctrine as incomprehensible.
Look at what Chafer, rather than accepting human free will, says about
GodÕs decree. ÒIt is not a mere purpose to give salvation to those who may be-
lieve; it rather determines who will believeÓ (p. 172). This negates the Òwhoso-
ever believeth in HimÓ of John 3:16. Thus, for Chafer, human destiny is Ònot
only foreseen, but was divinely purposedÓ (p. 175). The emphasis here is upon
the freedom of the divine free will which moves in upon human free will so that
the human willing is swallowed up in the irresistible sovereign omnipotent will
of God. Chafer also confuses election to mission with election to salvation,106 so
that the calling of Israel, Christ, and the Church are confused with the calling to
salvation. He needed to think through election of the saved in the light of their
crucial response to the universal love of God manifested in ChristÕs life and
death. He needed to realize that there are two equally necessary willings for hu-
man salvation: (1) divine will in providing the gift, and (2) human will in re-
ceiving the gift. It is not one without the other, as with Chafer, but both.
ChaferÕs appeal to the human incomprehensibility of the doctrine is shattered in
the light of divine revelation through ChristÕs mission.
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Augustus Strong, in his Systematic Theology, claims that human free will is
present in GodÕs election, for Òman influenced by divinely foreseen motives,
may still be free, and the divine decrees, which simply render certain manÕs ac-
tions, may also be perfectly consistent with manÕs freedom.Ó107 However, the
divine will and human will are related in such a way that the divine will swal-
lows up the human will. Thus, predestination is defined as GodÕs Òpurpose so to
act that certain will believe and be saved,Ó and is called election, and Òhis pur-
pose so to act that certain will refuse to believe and be lost is called reproba-
tion.Ó108 So God controls belief, and so genuine free will is scuttled. Thus, ÒNo
undecreed event can be foreseen,Ó because ÒOnly knowledge of that which is
decreed is foreknowledge.Ó109 Thus, GodÕs will has determined all future events,
such as a believing response to His salvation or an unbelieving rejection of His
salvation. Therefore, Strong jettisons the willing response of John 3:16.
StrongÕs system has a logical inconsistency in it, too. On the one hand he
can speak of salvation of the elect Òif he will only believe,Ó110 and rejection of
Òthe sinner to his self-chosen rebellion,Ó111 and Òthat freedom of will is neces-
sary to virtue,Ó112 and yet says Òthe initiative in human salvationÓ Òbelongs to
God.Ó ÒThat any should be saved, is matter of pure grace, and those who are not
included in this purpose of salvation suffer only the due reward of their deeds.
There is, therefore, no injustice in GodÕs election. We may better praise God that
saves any, than charge him with injustice because he saves so few.Ó113  This
totally ignores John 3:16, with GodÕs plan for universal salvation and its provi-
sion of human response to accept or reject.
In the traditionalist views on predestination Christ only died for the elect.
This limited atonement view was the logical conclusion to GodÕs alleged
choosing of only the elect in eternity and rejecting the rest. Often the elect were
understood as only few in number, while the majority of mankind were rejected.
So it was for the few that He came to live and to die. Although the election and
redemption, in these systems, was logically consistent in itself, it was premised
on taking texts that spoke about mission (Romans 9) and applying them to elec-
tion, and then in turn allowing election to confine ChristÕs mission. Thus Jacob
is loved and Esau is hated (Rom 9:13) applies to ChristÕs relation to mankind,
and the potter making vessels to honor and vessels to dishonor (Rom 9:21) ap-
plies to redemption.
This thinking moves from the unknown to the known, from the hidden God
to God revealed in Christ, from secret decrees to a public mission of Christ,
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from an incomprehensible purpose of a hidden God to a revelation of God
among men in Christ. Since when has an epistemology (path of knowing)
moved from the unknown to the known? Surely a reasonable epistemology will
move in the opposite direction, from the known to the unknown. The doctrine of
predestination, as classically taught, was thought out as if Christ had not come to
reveal the FatherÕs love for the world. Floundering on hidden decrees of an un-
known God, beyond, above, and separate from Jesus Christ, has impacted ad-
versely views of human destiny. Hence, if few are elected, then Christ not only
lived and died for a few, but only a few will go to heaven. Because the majority
were eternally rejected, then the majority lay outside ChristÕs life and death and
will be forever outside His mercy in eternal hell. The utter awfulness of this es-
chatology demands a better epistemology, at least to see if Scripture supports a
new approach.
Scripture is crystal clear that God the Father loves the world, and not just
the elect, and that He sent His Son to be the redeemer of all mankind (John 3:16-
17). We are not speaking here of a simplistic universalism that says all will be
saved. There is no universalism when it comes to eschatological destiny. GodÕs
deference to creaturely freedom not only allowed the fall, but also allows the
final rejection of salvation. But that does not negate the fact that the Trinity has
love for all mankind. The mission of Christ was universal, even if the response
to it has never been universal. It is important to keep these two in mind. The fact
that ChristÕs mission was universal even though human response to the mission
is not universal demonstrates that God does not predetermine humans against
their will and indicates that humans use their free will to accept or reject GodÕs
universal mission.
Far from secret decrees in eternity to save a few and damn the rest, ChristÕs
mission in human history is described as God Òreconciling the world to himself
in ChristÓ (2 Cor 5:19), for Òthe Father has sent his Son to be the Savior of the
worldÓ (1 John 4:14). Limited atonement is confined to secret decrees that never
were made. Christ came to earth to manifest what the decrees really were. Christ
came for a world, and not just for the elect. His atonement was unlimited. Thus,
ÒHe is the atoning sacrifice for our sins, and not only for ours but also for the
sins of the whole worldÓ (1 John 2:2), that Òhe might taste death for everyoneÓ
(Heb 2:9). The hidden decrees are ripped open and found to be other than re-
ported. Christ came to reveal what His Father is like (John 14:9). His love for
the whole world is but the manifestation of the FatherÕs love for the whole
world. And that love has always been from eternity, and this is why Jesus is
called the ÒLamb that was slain from the creation of the worldÓ (Rev 13:8).
It is exceedingly important not to reject the first chapters of Genesis as a
myth (Bultmann) or a saga (Barth). For in the fall of Adam and Eve (Gen 3)
there is a vital contribution to this topic. Eve chose to side with the crafty ser-
pent rather than with God. This open rebellion, thinking God was unjust because
allegedly keeping something back from her, is not only an insight into the ques-
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tion about God before the universe, but the questioning itself was the result of
human free will. Granted that Adam and Eve were without sin, and so had that
capacity. But to take away the freedom to choose from sinners would be cause
enough for them to say God is unjustÑparticularly since they have a predispo-
sition to sin, and there is an enemy tempting them. More than ever they need the
ability to choose. This does not suggest they can save themselves, or have merit
through choosing aright, or can do the choosing without divine help. ChristÕs
words are still true, Òapart from me you can do nothingÓ (John 15:5). But it is
also true that Christ is Òthe true light which enlightens every man coming into
the worldÓ (John 1:9).114
ÒEvery manÓ (panta anthropon) is present for either translation of this
verse. Either Christ comes as the Light (in His incarnation) for every man, or He
comes as light, through the Spirit, to every man who comes into the world. C. H.
Dodd believes both are intended.115 Leon Morris offers a perceptive insight, ÒIt
is common teaching of the New Testament writers that God has revealed some-
thing of Himself to all men (Rom. 1:20), sufficient at least for them to be
blameworthy when they take the wrong way instead of the right way. John at-
tributes this general illumination to the activity of the Word.Ó116 As Christ draws
people, illumines them, they have the ability to choose. The enlightening of hu-
mans rejects a confinement of  this to the elect, and enlightening rejects irresisti-
ble grace, for not all respond positively to the enlightenment.
Here we have a radical difference from traditional predestinarian views.
Rather than God being the one who elects or rejects, it is the human response to
His universal enlightening that separates the elected and the rejected. This
change is vital, for if God does all the electing and rejecting, then humans have
no part in choosing and hence would be unable to admit, before the universe,
that God is just in giving them the sentence they have chosen for themselves. So
it is mandatory not merely for salvation, but also for the resolution of the cosmic
controversy, that humans have the ability to choose. Humans must have free will
to weigh the evidence in the cosmic controversy and admit that God is right and
they are wrong.
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On the question of salvation being a choice that can be accepted or rejected
by humans, we are faced with the other reason why human free will is vital. If
human destiny is based upon GodÕs electing and rejecting, then the whole in-
terim of sin in the troubled universe is a waste of time and a horrible heartache,
for if God arbitrarily chooses human destiny, then why did He not choose to
disallow sin, so that human destiny could have been decided much earlier? Why
come in later and do what could have been done when it really counted? The
fact that He didnÕt would be cause enough to decide that God is unjust. Yet, be-
cause God does the electing and reprobating, humans would arbitrarily choose
God as just because they would be predestined to make that choice. On this ba-
sis the whole long cosmic controversy would be pointless. It would be a sham,
not really a battle between two sides claiming the choice of each human.
Rather than secret decrees, beyond human comprehension, of a hidden God
beyond and behind Christ, Scripture speaks of Òthe mystery of godlinessÓ as
Christ who Òappeared in a body, was vindicated by the Spirit, was seen by an-
gels, was preached among the nations, was believed on in the world, was taken
up in gloryÓ (1 Tim 3:16). This Òmystery hidden for long ages past, but now
revealed and made known through the prophetic writings by the command of the
eternal God,Ó is Òthat all nations might believe and obey himÓ (Rom 16:25-26).
It was precisely GodÕs universal love, which Israel failed to understand, that
Christ revealed. The secret is not predestination of the elect and damnation of
the reprobate for GodÕs glory. No. Paul says, Òwe speak of GodÕs secret wisdom,
a wisdom that has been hidden and that God destined for our glory before time
beganÓ (1 Cor 2:7). Not His glory, but human gloryÑdecreed in eter-
nityÑbefore time began. Paul said, ÒNone of the rulers of this age understood it,
for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of gloryÓ (1 Cor 2:8).
They misunderstood because they failed to understand the mission of Christ.
The Calvinistic limited atonement misunderstands His mission, too.
When we begin with ChristÕs mission on earth and see why He came and
how extensive was His goal, then we can proceed on the basis of a safe revela-
tion of the God who sent Him on that mission. ÒFor God so loved the worldÓ
(John 3:16). That is clear. Not the elect, but the world. There is no limit to His
love. So His love is universal. In coming, Jesus said, ÒI have come to do your
will, O GodÓ (Ps 40:6-8; Heb 10:7). Jesus came to manifest GodÕs universal
love. He also loved all mankind. So He could say, ÒAnyone who has seen me
has seen the FatherÓ (John 14:9). No hidden God here. Here is God revealed.
Here is a known GodÑOne who loved the world. This radically calls in ques-
tion a hidden God, past understanding, who has secret decrees that elect a few.
Such is a non-Christian view, because it looks behind Christ to some eternal
hiddenness and mystery, rather than going to His own revelation of God in His
mission for a world.
ÒWhosoever believeth in Him should not perish but have everlasting lifeÓ
(John 3:16). The rest of the text shows that this universal love of God for man-
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kind is not predetermined on every human. The difference between the two des-
tinies before mankind is not based on divine election/rejection, but on human
choice. Human belief determines human destiny. Acceptance is necessary or the
gift is never received. ChristÕs mission, therefore, was a calling of humans to
Himself. ÒCome unto me, all you who are weary and burdened, and I will give
you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn from me, for I am gentle and humble
in heart, and you will find rest for your soulsÓ (Matt 11:28-29).
Jesus never talked about a predetermined elect that His Father had willed to
save while passing by the rest. This was the error of Israel. They confused their
call to mission with a confined election to salvation. They claimed their eternal
destiny was based upon Abraham being their Father (Matt 3:7-12). ÒÔIf you were
AbrahamÕs children,Õ said Jesus, Ôthen you would do the things Abraham did. As
it is, you are determined to kill me, and man who has told you the truth that I
heard from God. Abraham did not do such things. You are doing the things your
own father doesÕÓ (John 8:39-40). ÒAbraham believed God. And it was credited
to him as righteousnessÓ (Rom 4:3). As such, Òhe is the father of all who be-
lieveÓ (Rom 4:11). Abraham was chosen for mission, to become Israel through
His grandson Jacob and be used as an avenue for God to reach the world.
ÒAbraham in hope believed and so became the father of many nationsÓ (Rom
4:18).
ÒTherefore, the promise comes by faith, so that it may be by grace and may
be guaranteed to all AbrahamÕs offspringÑnot only to those who are of the law
but also to those who are of the faith of Abraham. He is the father of us all. As it
is written,: ÔI have made you a father of many nationsÓ (Rom 4:16-17). In other
words, connection with AbrahamÑthe chosen one in missionÑdoes not save.
Belief in Christ alone saves, and that is open to anyone, irrespective of national
origin. Destiny is not according to divine decrees. ChristÕs mission for a world
indicates that GodÕs will is to save everyone. But, because God creates humans
to think, to will, and to choose, His mission in Christ was to make the call, for
ÒWhoever believes in the Son has eternal life, but whoever rejects the Son will
not see life, for GodÕs wrath remains on himÓ (John 3:36).
There it is: belief or rejectionÑaccepting Christ (electing Him as Savior) or
rejecting Him as Savior. This opens up the fact that there is both an objective
and a subjective side to a Christological way of looking at human destiny. Ob-
jectively Christ came for a world. He elected all and rejected none. Subjectively,
humans elect Him as Savior or reject Him as Savior. As far as human destiny is
concerned, there would be no future hope without the fact that God and Christ
have elected all mankind, yet human destiny is also finally dependent upon the
election/rejection of Jesus Christ by humans. God has elected Christ to save eve-
ryone. But humans elect or reject Christ, and so confine the realization of His
atonement for mankind. Objectively the atonement is unlimited. Subjectively its
realization in human history is limited. For human destiny is equally dependent
on both GodÕs choosing, and humans choice.
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Norman Geisler and Ron Brooks say, ÒKnowing what men will do with
their freedom is not the same as ordaining what they must do against their free
choice. GodÕs knowledge is not necessarily incompatible with free will. There is
no problem in saying that God created men with free will so that they could re-
turn His love, even though He knows that some will not make that decision. God
is responsible for the fact of freedom, but men are responsible for the acts of
freedom. In His knowledge, God might even persuade men to make certain deci-
sions, but there is no reason to suppose that He coerces any decision so as to
destroy freedom. He works persuasively, but not coercively.Ó117
Questions about Justice
William G. MacDonald tells of a person who believes GodÕs will in predes-
tination is inscrutable. His was the strangest statement I have ever heard on this
subject. ÒÔI will love God always,Õ he said, Ôeven if it should turn out in the end
that his eternal decree was to send me forever to hell.ÕÓ118 How could someone
really love God if He has arbitrarily decreed that he be lost, not given him a
chance for salvation, and rejected him merely on the whim of GodÕs own pleas-
ure? How could undeserved torture ever call forth a loving response? Such a
love of oneÕs enemy has only been seen in the way Jesus said, ÒFather, forgive
them, for they do not know what they are doingÓ (Luke 23:34) as He hung on
Calvary amidst the jeers and taunts of those who were responsible for putting
Him there. That kind of love is divine. But the fact that the person would be in
hell would suggest that it is not that kind of love that possesses him. Such love
would not be normal for a sinner condemned to eternal tormentÑunless GodÕs
divine will controls his will. That would be the logical extreme of predestina-
tion.
1. Irresistible Grace
On the other hand, predestination says irresistible grace is what determines
humans for heaven. Does irresistible grace and the will of God control human
willing even in heaven? If human free will has not been given its proper place in
human history, is it logical to assume that the same prevails in human destiny.
On that basis, no one saved could freely respond to the question of GodÕs jus-
tice. If grace is irresistible, it could be argued that those irresistibly carried along
by grace have no choice but to concur with God. It that were true, even though
they say He is just, the process to get them to say this would be unjust.
If this is true about the elect, what about the reprobate? Augustine and Lu-
ther would agree with Calvin that in sin-history manÕs Òimage of GodÓ is Òef-
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faced,Ó not just marred.119  This Òtotal depravityÓ robs the reprobate of free will
and denies them the ability to concur with GodÕs justice in the final eschatologi-
cal judgment. It might be assumed easier for the elect to bow the knee, saying
ÒGod is just,Ó than for the reprobate. Yet the concurrence of the reprobate with
GodÕs decisions must also take place, for the prophecy is that Òevery knee will
bowÓ (Isa 45:23Ð24; cf. Ps 145:9Ð10; Rom 14:10; Rev 5:13; 15:3Ð4; 19:1Ð2),
redeemed and reprobate. It will be unanimous. Neither can ignore the over-
whelming manifestation of GodÕs justice. But if the reprobate have no free will,
then the largest group of created beings cannot bow the knee before GodÕs jus-
tice, and hence the controversy remains unresolved.
2. The Divine Command Theory of Ethics
The Divine Command theory of ethics says that anything God commands is
right because it is God who commands it. This means that a command is not
right in itself, right because it is right, but only right because of who commands
it. As Jerry L. Walls put it, Òif God commanded us to do something that seemed
to us clearly wrong, it would be wrong not to obey.Ó120 This makes redundant
human ability to choose between right and wrong, because right is right and
wrong is wrong.
One can see the parallel between the Divine Command theory and the the-
ory of predestination as usually taught. It is not good enough to assume that se-
cretive decrees issued by an unknown God are right because He is alleged to be
the one issuing them. Given a cosmic controversy, with GodÕs justice being
questioned by nearly all who have fallen, this would be a very unwise approach
for God to take. Even Luther admits that one day, Òthe Ôlight of gloryÕ will dis-
pel the seeming injustices of GodÕs predestinationÓ121 Augustus Strong says,
Òonly the higher knowledge of the future state will furnish the answers.Ó122 It is
not good enough to appeal to some future understanding that causes present un-
derstanding to accept what obviously is unjust. A present injustice (like arbitrary
secret decrees without reference to human free will) does not become just when
we see the God who issued it, any more than a divine command to do what is
wrong will somehow become right when we see the God who commanded it.
The Westminster Shorter Catechism (1647) says, ÒThe decrees of God are
his eternal purpose according to the counsel of his will, whereby, for his own
glory, he hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass.Ó123 In the Westminster
Confession of Faith (1647) it says about the reprobate, ÒThe rest of mankind
God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will,
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whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of  his
sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor
and wrath for their sins, to the praise of his glorious justice.Ó124 When you put
these two together, then Òglorious justiceÓ is defined by a personal glory deci-
sion. No person is glorified who withholds mercy when he could give it. Such is
injustice, and not Òglorious justice.Ó
Scripture gives a totally different picture. When facing death for all man-
kind, Jesus prayed ÒFather the time has come. Glorify your Son, that your Son
man glorify youÓ (John 17:1). It is at Calvary, within human history, that the
Òglorious justiceÓ of God was revealed. For, ÒGod made him who had no sin to
be sin for us, so that in him we might become the righteousness of GodÓ (2 Cor
5:21). It is here that God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son
(John 3:16). He became the reprobate in order to save all reprobates who will
accept. He took the place of every human, that Òwhosoever believeth in Him
should not perish but have everlasting lifeÓ (John 3:16). This is His glorious
mercy.
His glorious justice was paying the price for human sin, taking the punish-
ment as He plunged into the Godforsakenness of the lost (Matt 27:46). ÒHe was
pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our iniquities; the punishment
that brought us peace was upon him, and by his wounds we are healed. We all,
like sheep, have gone astray, each one of us has turned to his own way; and the
Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us allÓ (Isa 53:5-6). The idea of glorious
justice being attached to not giving mercy, and so damning, is a view that is
contrary to the cross. It is a view that does not allow what took place at Calvary
to have interpretive value on matters of predestination. It is a sub-Christian
view, because it fails to see the true Òglorious justiceÓ of God in His total self-
giving for all mankind, rather than being locked into some selfish motive of
good pleasure that refuses to be merciful. Justice and mercy met at Calvary:
justice because Christ atoned for all mankind, mercy because this atonement was
offered to whoever will accept it. Even at Calvary God does not force His will
on the wills of humans. Even though the salvation of all may seem good, as uni-
versalists believe, yet to take those to heaven who never chose Christ would be
to take people to an experience for which they are unfitted. To be forced into
heaven against oneÕs will would in fact be hell to them.
In the relativism of postmodernity there are no absolutes. Something is not
right because it is right in itself. It is only right in the eyes of the beholder, or the
doer. ÒIf it feels right do it!Ó If God issued secret, arbitrary decrees because they
felt rightÑit was His good pleasure, for His own gloryÑthen that is what peo-
ple will see when they see Him. Such a God is not the Father who loved the
worldÑfor its sake, not HisÑand gave His only Son to come on a dangerous
journey to redeem it at any cost to Himself. This totally unselfish outgoing of
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the Godhead to save a rebel race has no connection to a God who merely issues
decrees for His own good pleasure, irrespective of whether it is perceived just or
not.
In commenting on the Divine Command Theory, Jerry Walls rightly said,
ÒThe theory of predestination espoused by Luther and Calvin has the same sort
of problem. It requires us to believe God is right in unconditionally damning
whomever he will, even though this deeply offends our sense of justice.Ó125
3. GodÕs Justice Beyond Human Comprehension
The concept of GodÕs justice being on trial ever since LuciferÕs rebellion, of
GodÕs maligned justice being the central issue in the cosmic controversy, never
enters the debates on predestination. Yet it is the crucial biblical worldview that
forms the broadest context within which predestination texts need to be inter-
preted correctly. So often in the debates God is incomprehensible, so that it is
impossible to fathom Him, and hence, appeal is made to Him as One far beyond
human comprehension. Once one accepts this view, then it is hopeless to argue
that human beings can freely yield to His justice. It is assumed that the evidence
for His justice is not revealed. As Jerry L. Walls says, commenting on LutherÕs
position, ÒSince God is inaccessible to human understanding, it is inevitable that
his justice eludes our grasp.Ó126
It is this elusive justice which nags at human reasoning. No wonder, in tra-
ditional predestinarian views, it is the damning of the reprobate that is dubbed as
GodÕs justice, the very opposite of what normal human reasoning would con-
clude.
4. Problem of Evil
We have already noted how the famous philosopher Alvin Platinga dealt
with the problem of evil, believing that it is not inconsistent for an all loving, all
powerful God to create a world with the potential of evil. In this section we will
broaden the input by considering what others have said about this problem, and
consider the eschatological implications.
Many atheists believe the problem of evil is the primary reason for unbelief
in a God who is omnipotent and loving. If He allowed evil when He need not
have done so, where is His love? If He couldnÕt stop it, where is His power? In
protology, we confine ourselves to the fact of evil and ask what the presence of
evil says about the justice (not power or love) of God. If God permitted evil, is
He just?
Supralapsarians place the divine decrees before creation of the good and the
presence of evil, and God is said to ordain all things. So He ordained evil even
as He ordained the good. So is He just? As noted above, Augustine speaks of
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evil as the privatio boni, or deprivation of the good. If God has omniscience and
knows the future fully, then He knew that evil would come into the universe. If
He still went ahead and created angels and humans, knowing they would sin,
does He not have some responsibility for evil? John Hick said it is Òhard to clear
God from ultimate responsibility for the existence of sin, in view of the fact that
He chose to create a being whom He foresaw would, if He created him, freely
sin.Ó127
Even though classical predestination has God ordaining evil in His eternal
decrees, exponents separate the ordaining of evil from the personal responsibil-
ity of those who sin. It is a logical inconsistency in their systems, for God cannot
be said to ordain that for which He is not responsible. Some writers have used
the word ÒpermitÓ rather than ordain, and I concur that GodÕs permissive will is
involved in the presence of evil. But if evil is present due to GodÕs permissive
will, then the sinner must have free will to choose evil. Again, the presence of
divine permissive will and absence of human free will is not consistent. The free
will to sin was exercised by angels when they sinned in heaven (Rev 12:7-8),
and by Adam and Eve in their fall  (Gen 3:1-19). Permissive divine will and
angelic and human free will continue to be present throughout the history of sin.
For one day, all the lostÑangels and humansÑwill see that their lives were
a series of free will choices that locked them into their destiny. The fact of their
being lost is no fault of God, but purely their own choice. That choice was not a
singular choice made at the beginning of their journey, but a habit of choosing
throughout life until they were unchangeable, and hence locked into their own
future by their own choices. God merely permitted them the freedom to make
these choices along the way. Only then, on that day, will they admit that God is
just and that their awful destiny is their own responsibility, and theirs alone.
William Craig is right that lost persons Òcannot complain of injustice on GodÕs
part.Ó For He provided salvation for all, and Òthe only reason they are not pre-
destined is that they freely ignore or reject the divine helps that God provides.
Their damnation is therefore entirely their own fault.Ó128  God offers all man-
kind the same destiny. The fact that so many will not receive it is because they
refused to receive it. They will know one day that they were the ones who turned
it down, because they turned Christ down.
God would have it no other way, for He wants created beings to be free and
to enjoy Him in perfect freedom. Free will is a component not lost through the
fall. At the level of living, everyone knows they have the freedom to choose on a
daily basis. For those who get to heaven, it is true that such choosing does not
earn salvation or merit their entrance there, but it is indispensable in the process
of preparation to receive the gift of eternal life. Only then will persons be free
throughout eternity.
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But why the presence of evil? Could God have made a different world with
different people? The answer is yes. But in His infinite foreknowledge, He made
the best of all possible worlds, a world where free choice is both a blessing,
when used rightly, and a curse, when used wrongly. Evil was inevitable in such
a world, but evil must not be considered merely according to its present contri-
bution. In endless eternity, the presence of evil is just a blip on the screen, a
small pause. We must look at the presence of evil within the context of eternity,
not just in time. From the breadth of eternity it will be seen that the free will
world, in spite of evil, was the best world, for even the entrance of evil has
brought benefits.
Evil entered the universe as a tragic rebellion with widespread repercus-
sions throughout the cosmos. Angels and humans entered into rebellion against
their Creator. This is the original villain and hero story, Satan and Christ. Satan
has brought unspeakable heartache into the universe. He did not do this by se-
cret, hidden, and inscrutable decrees. He is a creature gone crazy, doing the un-
speakable, rebelling against the One who gave him life, for all things were cre-
ated by God the Father through His Son (John 1:1-2; Col 1:15-16; Heb 1:1-3).
From the beginning of the rebellion he has appealed to the free will of angels
and humans, and he continues to do so in his quest to take over as many as he
can. Clearly Satan is responsible for evil, not God. God merely permitted evil.
But why did He permit it? Thomas Aquinas says, ÒGod allows evils to happen in
order to bring a great good therefrom. . . .Ó129  What a marvelous insight! Alvin
Platinga speaks in a similar manner. ÒGod permits evil because he can achieve a
world he sees as better by permitting evil than by preventing it..Ó130
Think of it. Evil was permitted, but salvation was planned. God was ready
for the eventuality. He knew free will would be used wrongly and planned from
eternity to save the free willers from the results of their free willing. As soon as
there was sin, there was a Savior. God the Father Òchose us in him before the
creation of the world to be holy and blameless in his sight. In love he predes-
tined us to be adopted as his sons through Jesus Christ, in accordance with his
pleasure and will. . . .Ó (Eph 1:4-5). Hence redemption came through Òthe pre-
cious blood of Christ, a lamb without blemish or defect. He was chosen before
the creation of the world. . . .Ó (1 Pet 1:19-20). So Christ is spoken of as Òthe
Lamb that was slain from the creation of the worldÓ (Rev 13:8). This is why in
the eschatological separation of the saved from the lost at the second advent of
Christ, He will say to the saved, ÒCome, you who are blessed by my Father; take
your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the worldÓ
(Matt 25:34).
God was not caught by surprise. He planned for the terrible eventuality of
evil. He laid the plan in eternity before the creation of the world. In this sense
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salvationÕs plan preceded creation in the mind of God. He planned to make re-
bels His sons and daughters. They would become what they had not beenÑevil.
But they would also become what they had not beenÑsons and daughters of
God. This is an incredible difference, from created beings to sons and daughters
of their Creator and King! Here is the good that has come out of evil. This is
what God knew about in His foreknowledge. This is why foreknowledge is so
much more important in protology than preordination. He knew what would
happen. He did not make it happen. He has a plan, but the plan does not violate
creaturely free will.
The plan of redemption has been known from eternity. Then came the mo-
ment for Christ to enter planet earth, for the Creator to become a creature, for
the eternal One to enter time, for God to become the God-man. ÒThen I said,
ÔHere I amÑit is written about me in the scrollÑI have come to do your will, O
GodÕÓ (Heb 10:7). It was the FatherÕs will to save, and it was ChristÕs will to be
the Savior. ÒFor God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that
whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life. For God did not
send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to save the world through
himÓ (John 3:16-17). What an utterly remarkable response to human rebellion!
God poured out all heaven in the gift of His Son. He could give nothing better or
more. He gave everything. His will served His love in reaching out to save a
world.
In the incarnation God took up humanity and assumed it within His very di-
vine being through Mary. In joining a rebel race with the royal Creator, God and
man were united in the person of the Son. In His very being the gulf gouged
through human rebellion was bridged. In Him God and man were once more at-
one-ment. This is one side of the enormous and expensive atonement plan for all
mankind. The uniting of humanity to divinity has raised the human race far
above the level of its pristine state before the fall. At that time they were merely
created beings. Although perfect and loyal, they were still a great distance from
their eternal Creator. Even before the fall there was an infinite qualitative dis-
tinction between God and man, to use the words of Soren Kierkegaard. The in-
carnation bridged that gulf and elevated the human race as nothing else could.
The redeemed will always worship God as Creator, Redeemer, and King,
but always have the privilege of being sons and daughter in the Trinitarian fam-
ily. This is why God will come to this world and make His dwelling place with
mankind (Rev 21:1-3). Heaven will be depopulated as all come to the earth
made new. Throughout eternity the closeness of the redeemed with their Re-
deemer will forever call forth gratitude and praise. As the ChristÕs condescen-
sion in becoming a man in sinful history and dying for rebels to give them re-
demption slowing sinks into their minds, the hearts of the redeemed will thrill
with unspeakable amazement. This amazement will deepen as His love is expe-
rienced and understood.
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All will then see that the presence of evil in the universe has brought greater
good than if sin had never entered. The fact that God was willing to become a
human and to suffer so much in life and death to save humans will bring all cre-
ated beingsÑfallen and unfallenÑcloser to God than their original state could
have afforded. They will comprehend the depths of His love as only the incar-
national life and death of Jesus Christ could reveal. In redemption they behold
the heart of the Redeemer, and in the Redeemer they behold the love of the Fa-
ther and the Holy Spirit.
The eschatological implications have become obvious. Throughout eternity
none of the redeemed will question why evil was permitted. They will realize
that their lot is far better because it did exist. Their very existence is evidence
that God is just.
The Most Important Attribute of God
It follows, from what we said above, that the supreme attribute that defines
God is love. John saw it. ÒGod is love. This is how God showed his love among
us: He sent his one and only Son into the world that we might live through him. .
. . And we have seen and testify that the Father has sent his Son to be the Savior
of the world . . . God is loveÓ (1 John 4:8-9, 14,16). ÒFor God so loved the
worldÓ (John 3:16), and Òthe fruit of the Spirit [of God] is love, joy , peace, pa-
tience, kindness, goodness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-controlÓ
(Gal 5:22-23). The other attributes listed are what constitute love.
From the biblical data looked at in this chapter, it is clear that God loves the
world, Christ came for the world, and the Holy Spirit brings the ascended Christ
as the light to everyone coming into the world (John 1:9). It is GodÕs love that
brought Him to Calvary. It is His love that woos human minds and brings them
to decide to accept His salvation. It is this eternal love that should have had
center place in discussing GodÕs relationship to a lost world. But, in its place,
the will of God has held center place, and into that will has been read data taken
from His choices for mission (Jacob, not Esau; vessels to honor and dishonor),
as if they were choices for election/reprobation. It has been a sorry wrong road.
It has radically called in question GodÕs unsurpassable love and made shipwreck
of millions who could not comprehend such unbelievable child abuseÑGod
withholding salvation from most of His children and then throwing them away
to eternal hell!
It is time to go back to Calvary and see there revealed the incomprehensible
love of God. It is the depths of that love that defy human understanding, and not
some eternal predestination. For our destiny was not made in eternity but at Cal-
vary. That was the unparalleled eschatological event that determines all human
destiny. Calvary is a baring of GodÕs love that defies every lesser god, be it
heathen or sovereign. The blazing revelation of GodÕs love at the cross shatters
any idea of a hidden god, choosing a few and passing by most. Calvary shouts
out loud and clear, ÒFor God so loved the world!Ó Calvary is GodÕs statement
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about predestination. It will have no other rivals. Given a cosmic controversy,
one expects many rivals, the worst of which attempt to change what took place
there. To hide the greatest revelation and then appeal to a hidden GodÕs decrees
in eternity, cut off from any connection to Calvary, does despite to the cross.
Has this not happened, even though unwittingly, and perhaps with the best of
intentions? Calvary is no country club ticket for members only. Calvary impacts
the world. Calvary impacts the universe. For Calvary says more about God than
anything else, and so Calvary is the most important evidence about God in the
cosmic controversy. No wonder Satan and his fiends strive to keep that vision
away from human minds.
There ÒGod made him who had no sin to be sin for us, so that in him we
might become the righteousness of GodÓ (2 Cor 5:21). Here ÒGod was recon-
ciling the world to himself in ChristÓ (2 Cor 5:19). Even the Old Testament
prophets understood. ÒSurely he took up our infirmities and carried our sorrows,
yet we considered him stricken by God, smitten by him, and afflicted. But he
was pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our iniquities; the pun-
ishment that brought us peace was upon him, and by his wounds we are healed.
We all, like sheep, have gone astray, each of us has turned to his own way; and
the Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us allÕ (Isa 53:4-6).
Calvary was an eschatological event. It was GodÕs determinative victory
over Satan and his rebels. It decided their destiny (Rev 12:9-1). ChristÕs victory
at the cross was the completion of a life that revealed what God is really like
(John 14:9). At Calvary the universe saw that God was willing to die for those
who rebelled against Him. They gazed into the depths of His justice. He the
Sinless One (cf. John 13:2) took the place of sinners. SatanÕs lie about God be-
ing unjust was exposed. By contrast they saw who worked behind the scenes to
crucify Christ. Satan had dogged His footsteps throughout life to get Him to sin
and come under his control. He fiendishly worked through Jewish leaders, Ro-
man authority, and the rabble to crucify Him. On Calvary redemption and rebel-
lion met head on. Christ died for sinners. Satan crucified the Sinless One. What
a stark contrast. Calvary was the revelation of God and of Satan. Not God, but
Satan was exposed as unjust at Calvary. The universe watched and understood.
And in that double revelation at Calvary, Christ answered the charge in the cos-
mic controversy.
Calvary was also GodÕs judgment of sin. There Christ tasted Òdeath for eve-
ryoneÓ (Heb 2:9). There He was judged for the sins of all in their place (cf. 2
Cor 5:21). Christ was the Substitute for mankind (John 3:16-17). There, Òthe
Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us allÓ (Isa 53:6). Belief in and acceptance
of that sacrifice determines destiny. Calvary is the greatest revelation to the uni-
verse that God had one destiny in mind for all mankind. He died to save all.
Calvary shatters the myth of a hidden eternal will of God that chooses only a
few and passes by the rest. For what God is in His revelation at the cross He is
antecedently from eternity. From eternity God loved the world. From eternity
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He willed to save the human race. Calvary is the ultimate manifestation of His
eternal will and love for all mankind. The Augustinian-Lutheran-Calvinistic
predestinarian views do not belong to the Christ who hangs on the cross.
The Final Judgment
Eschatology moves toward the Final Judgment (Rev 20:11-15) and the new
creation (Rev 21-22). Why is there a need for a Final Judgment if God has pre-
determined human destiny? If He knows from eternity who are the elect and
who the reprobate, and if He has known this through predetermining the out-
come, and if this is a part of His incomprehensible plan that humans should not
pry into, then why does He even bother with a Final Judgment?
Here is a logical inconsistency in predestinarian theology. For if one merely
accepts that God is just, not questioning the fact, even calling reprobation to
eternal hell torment just, as salvation is merciful, then on these grounds one
would not expect or need a Final Judgment. For if one accepts what God does in
hidden decrees of election/reprobation as appropriate because He is God and has
a right to do what He pleases with His created beings, then that same logic
should be appropriate for the final destiny of these two groups, without the need
of a judgment.
On the other hand, if it is deemed necessary to have a Final Judgment (as
Scripture teaches), then there must be more to the importance of human destiny
than a mere faith in a predetermining God who is just. If it is necessary for God
to allow all created beings to know something about their destiny, then it would
appear that He is not above human questioning in this matter, so that all appeal
to His inscrutable decrees being off limits to human understanding is inappro-
priate. For after all, it is these inscrutable decrees that will be actualized in the
Final Judgment.
As Gordon R. Lewis and Bruce A. Demarest put it, ÒIf GodÕs will prevails
in the world, how could a person justly be judged for his actions?Ó131 James D.
G. Dunn observes, ÒThe trouble with such a strong view of election and rejec-
tion without reference to subsequent deeds and misdeeds is that it makes GodÕs
judgments on these deeds and misdeeds seem unfair. ÔIf he hardens whom he
will, why does he find fault? For who has resisted his will?Õ The two perspec-
tives on human life from opposite ends of the time scale (election and judgment)
seem to conflict.Ó132
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